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A substantial literature over the past thirty years has evaluated tradeoffs between 
money and fatality risks.  These values in turn serve as estimates of the value of a 
statistical life.  This article reviews more than 60 studies of mortality risk premiums from 
ten countries and approximately 40 studies that present estimates of injury risk premiums.  
This critical review examines a variety of econometric issues, the role of unionization in 
risk premiums, and the effects of age on the value of a statistical life.  Our meta-analysis 
indicates an income elasticity of the value of a statistical life from about 0.5 to 0.6.  The 
paper also presents a detailed discussion of policy applications of these value of a 
statistical life estimates and related issues, including risk-risk analysis. 
   
 
1
The Value of a Statistical Life:  
A Critical Review of Market Estimates throughout the World 
 
W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph E. Aldy 
 
Introduction 
  Individuals make decisions everyday that reflect how they value health and 
mortality risks, such as driving an automobile, smoking a cigarette, and eating a medium-
rare hamburger.  Many of these choices involve market decisions, such as the purchase of 
a hazardous product or working on a risky job.  Because increases in health risks are 
undesirable, there must be some other aspect of the activity that makes it attractive.   
Using evidence on market choices that involve implicit tradeoffs between risk and 
money, economists have developed estimates of the value of a statistical life (VSL).  This 
article provides a comprehensive review and evaluation of the dozens of such studies 
throughout the world that have been based on market decisions.
1 
These VSL estimates in turn provide governments with a reference point for 
assessing the benefits of risk reduction efforts.  The long history of government risk 
policies ranges from the draining of swamps near ancient Rome to suppress malaria to the 
limits on air pollution in developed countries over the past 30 years (McNeill 1976, 
OECD 2001).  All such policy choices ultimately involve a balancing of additional risk 
reduction and incremental costs. 
The proper value of the risk reduction benefits for government policy is society’s 
willingness to pay for the benefits.  In the case of mortality risk reduction, the benefit is
                                                 
1 Past reviews of this literature include Smith (1979), Miller (1990), and Viscusi (1992, 1993, 2000).  
Several researchers have conducted meta-analyses of this literature, including Liu, Hammitt, and Liu 
(1997), Miller (2000), Bowland and Beghin (2001), and Mrozek and Taylor (2002).  See Hammitt (2002) 
and Krupnick (2002) for commentaries on the Mrozek and Taylor paper.  
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the value of the reduced probability of death that is experienced by the affected 
population, not the value of the lives that have been saved ex post.  The economic 
literature has focused on willingness-to-pay (willingness-to-accept) measures of mortality 
risk since Schelling’s (1968) discussion of the economics of life saving. 
Most of this literature has concentrated on valuing mortality risk by estimating 
compensating differentials for on-the-job risk exposure in labor markets.  While the early 
studies assessed such compensating differentials in the United States, much of the more 
recent work has attempted to estimate risk-money tradeoffs for other developed and some 
developing countries.  In addition, economists have also investigated price-risk (price-
safety) tradeoffs in product markets, such as for automobiles and fire alarms. 
Use of the economic research on the value of mortality and injury risks in 
government policy evaluation has been a key benefit component of policy evaluations for 
a wide range of health, safety, and environmental policies.  The policy use of risk 
valuations, however, has raised new questions about the appropriateness of these 
applications.    How should policymakers reconcile the broad range of VSL estimates in 
the literature?  Should the value of a statistical life vary by income?  Should the VSL 
vary by the age distribution of the affected population?  What other factors may influence 
the transfer of mortality risk valuation estimates from journal articles to policy evaluation 
in different contexts? 
We begin our assessment of this literature with an overview of the hedonic wage 
methodology in Section 1.  This approach motivates the discussion of the data and 
econometric issues associated with estimating a VSL.  Although there continue to be 
controversies regarding how best to isolate statistically the risk-money tradeoffs, the  
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methodologies used in the various studies typically follow a common strategy of 
estimating the locus of market equilibria regarding money-risk tradeoffs rather than 
isolating either market supply curves or market demand curves. 
Section 2 examines the extensive literature based on estimates using U.S. labor 
market data, which typically show a VSL in the range of $4 million to $9 million.  These 
values are similar to those generated by U.S. product market and housing market studies, 
which are reviewed in Section 3.  A parallel literature reviewed in Section 4 examines the 
implicit value of the risk of nonfatal injuries.  These nonfatal risks are of interest in their 
own right and as a control for hazards other than mortality risks that could influence the 
VSL estimates. 
Researchers subsequently have extended such analyses to other countries.   
Section 5 indicates that notwithstanding the quite different labor market conditions 
throughout the world, the general order of magnitude of these foreign VSL estimates 
tends to be similar to that in the United States.  International estimates tend to be a bit 
lower than in the United States, as one would expect given the positive income elasticity 
with respect to the value of risks to one’s life. 
A potentially fundamental concern with respect to use of VSL estimates in 
different contexts is how these values vary with income.  While the income elasticity 
should be positive on theoretical grounds, extrapolating these values across different 
contexts requires an empirical estimate of this elasticity.  Our meta-analyses of VSL 
estimates throughout the world in Section 6 imply point estimates of the income elasticity 
in the range of 0.50 to 0.60.  The meta-analysis also provides a characterization of the 
uncertainty around the measures of central tendency for the value of a statistical life, i.e.,  
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95 percent confidence intervals for the predicted VSLs.  Heterogeneity in VSL estimates 
based on union status (Section 7) and age (Section 8) indicate that the VSL not only 
varies by income but also across these important labor market dimensions.  The existence 
of such heterogeneity provides a cautionary note for policy.  While policymakers have 
relied on VSL estimates to an increasing degree in their benefit assessments, as Section 9 
indicates, matching these values to the pertinent population at risk is often problematic, 
particularly for people at the extreme ends of the age distribution. 
 
1. Estimating the value of a statistical life from labor markets 
1.1 The hedonic wage methodology 
More than two centuries ago, Adam Smith (1776) noted in The Wealth of Nations 
that: “The wages of labour vary with the ease or hardship, the cleanliness or dirtiness, the 
honourableness or dishonourableness of the employment” (p. 112).  Finding empirical 
evidence of such compensating differentials, however, has been problematic.  Because of 
the positive income elasticity of the demand for safety, the most attractive jobs in society 
tend to be the highest paid.  To disentangle the wage-risk tradeoff from the other factors 
that affect wages, economists have relied on statistical models that control both for 
differences in worker productivity as well as different quality components of the job.  
The primary approach has been hedonic wage and hedonic price models that examine the 
equilibrium risk choices and either the wage levels or price levels associated with these 
choices.
2  Market outcomes reflect the joint influence of labor demand and labor supply, 
                                                 
2 For more extensive discussion of hedonic analysis, see Griliches (1971), Rosen (1974, 1986), Thaler and 
Rosen (1975), Smith (1979), and Viscusi (1979).  
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but hedonic models do not examine the underlying economic structure that gives rise to 
these outcomes.  For concreteness, we focus on the hedonic wage case. 
The firm’s demand for labor decreases with the total cost of employing a worker.  
The cost of a worker may include the worker’s wage; training; benefits such as health 
insurance, vacation, child care; and the costs of providing a safe working environment.  
Because worker costs increase with the level of safety, for any given level of profits the 
firm must pay workers less as the safety level rises.  Figure 1 depicts two firms with 
wage-risk offer curves (isoprofit curves) with wage as an increasing function of risk, OC1 
for firm 1 and OC2 for firm 2.  For any given level of risk, workers prefer the wage-risk 
combination from the market offer curve with the highest wage level.  The outer 
envelope of these offer curves is the market opportunities locus w(p). 
The worker’s supply of labor is in part a function of the worker’s preferences over 
wages and risk.  The labor supply is best characterized subject to several mild restrictions 
on preferences.  Consider a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility model with state-
dependent utility functions.
3  Let U(w) represent the utility of a healthy worker at wage w 
and let V(w) represent the utility of an injured worker at wage w.  Typically, workers’ 
compensation after an injury is a function of the worker’s wage.  We assume that the 
relationship between workers’ compensation and the wage is subsumed into the 
functional form of V(w).  Further, assume that workers prefer to be healthy than injured 
[U(w) > V(w)] and that the marginal utility of income is positive [U'(w) > 0, V'(w) > 0].
4 
Workers choose from potential wage-risk combinations along some market 
opportunities locus w(p) to maximize expected utility.  In Figure 1, the tangency between 
                                                 
3 For a discussion of irrational behavior in the presence of mortality risk inconsistent with expected utility 
theory, refer to Viscusi 1998. 
4 Individual risk neutrality or risk aversion, i.e., U'', V'' ≤ 0 is required to ensure a global maximum.  
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the constant expected utility locus EU1 and firm 1’s offer curve OC1 represents worker 
1’s optimal job risk choice.  Likewise, worker 2 maximizes expected utility at the 
tangency between EU2 and OC2.  All wage-risk combinations associated with a given 
worker’s constant expected utility locus must satisfy   
) ( ) ( ) 1 ( w pV w U p Z + − = . 
The wage-risk tradeoff along this curve is given by 
0
) ( ' ) ( ' ) 1 (
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so that the required wage rate is increasing in the risk level.  The wage-risk tradeoff 
consequently equals the difference in the utility levels in the two states divided by the 
expected marginal utility of income. 
  Actual labor market decisions by workers can be depicted by the wage-risk 
combinations at the tangencies of the offer curves and expected utility loci at points (p1, 
w1) and (p2, w2).  All that is observable using market data are these points of tangency.  
Expanding beyond our two worker example, observations of a large set of workers can 
show the locus of these workers’ wage-risk tradeoffs, depicted by the curve w(p) in 
Figure 1.  Hedonic wage analyses trace out points on this w(p) curve that workers find 
acceptable.  
  The observed labor market decisions (pi, wi) reflect the joint influence of supply 
and demand on the market equilibrium.  The estimated tradeoff between wage and risk, 
∂w/∂p, is a local measure of the wage-risk tradeoff for marginal changes in risk.  This 
estimated slope corresponds to both the worker’s marginal willingness to accept risk and 
the worker’s marginal willingness to pay for more safety and the firm’s marginal cost of 
more safety as well as the firm’s marginal cost reduction from an incremental increase in  
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risk.  For the worker and firm associated with a given labor market decision (pi, wi), 
∂wi/∂pi reflects both the marginal supply price and the marginal demand price of risk.  
Econometric models that estimate a linear w(p) curve are estimating an average tradeoff 
rate across different levels of risk. 
  The estimated wage-risk tradeoff curve w(p) does not imply how a particular 
worker must be compensated for non-marginal changes in risk.  Consider workers 1 and 
2 in Figure 1.   Worker 2 has revealed a willingness to accept risk p2 at wage w2(p2) along 
EU2.  A change in the risk exposure to worker 1 from p1 to p2 would require a higher 
wage compensation to keep worker w1 on the expected utility locus (EU1), implying that 
w1(p2) > w2(p2) (or alternatively, that ∂w1/∂p2 > ∂w2/∂p2).  With large changes in risk, a 
worker’s wage-risk tradeoff will not be the same because the relevant tradeoff must be 
made along the worker’s expected utility locus, not the estimated market wage-risk 
tradeoff.   
1.2 Econometrics and data issues in hedonic labor market analysis 
Most researchers estimate the wage-risk relationship in labor markets by 
specifying a wage equation along the lines of the following: 
i i i i i i i i i i H p WC q q p X H w ε β γ γ γ β β α + ′ + + + + ′ + ′ + = 3 3 2 1 2 1  
where wi is the worker i’s wage rate, α is a constant term, H is a vector of personal 
characteristic variables for worker i, X is a vector of job characteristic variables for 
worker i, pi is the fatality risk associated with worker i’s job, qi is the nonfatal injury risk 
associated with worker i’s job, WCi is the workers’ compensation benefits payable for a 
job injury suffered by worker i, and εi is the random error reflecting unmeasured factors  
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influencing worker i’s wage rate.  The terms α,  β1,  β2,  β3,  γ1,  γ2, and γ3 represent 
parameters estimated through regression analysis. 
The personal characteristic variables represented by Hi often include a variety of 
human capital measures, such as education and job experience, as well as other individual 
measures, such as age and union status.  The job characteristic variables represented by X 
often include indicators for blue-collar jobs, white-collar jobs, management positions, the 
worker’s industry, and measures of physical exertion associated with the job.  These two 
sets of variables reflect both workers’ preferences over jobs as well as firms’ offer curves 
for labor.  Some studies interact personal characteristics Hi with the fatality risk pi  to 
capture how the returns to risk may vary with these characteristics, such as age and union 
status. 
1.2.1 Risk data.  An ideal measure of on-the-job fatality and injury risk would reflect 
both the worker’s perception of such risk and the firm’s perception of the risk.  Because 
the market opportunity locus reflects both workers’ preferences over income and risk and 
firms’ preferences over costs and safety, information on both sets of beliefs would be 
necessary to appropriately characterize the risk premium.  However, very few studies 
have compiled workers’ subjective preferences regarding risks (Viscusi 1979, Viscusi 
and O’Connor 1984, Gerking et al. 1988, and Liu and Hammitt 1999) and there is no 
available research on firms’ risk perceptions.  If individuals’ and firms’ subjective risk 
perceptions closely reflect objective measures of fatality risk, then such objective risk 
data could be used instead as a proxy for unobserved subjective risk data.
5  The standard 
                                                 
5 Gaba and Viscusi (1998) compared qualitative and quantitative subjective measures of on-the-job 
accident risk.  They find that for a given level of quantitative risk, a college-educated individual is more 
likely to report that risk as “dangerous” than an individual with less than college education.  For example, 
for those workers who report their quantitative risk as comparable to an annual injury risk of less than 1 in  
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approach in the literature is to use industry-specific or occupation-specific risk measures 
reflecting an average of at least several years of observations for fatalities, which tend to 
be relatively rare events.
6 
  Measures of job-related fatality and injury risk have included self-reported risks 
based on worker surveys and objective risk measures derived from actuarial tables, 
workers’ compensation records, and surveys and censuses of death certificates.  The 
choice of the measure of fatality risk can significantly influence the magnitude of the risk 
premium estimated through regression analysis.  The nature of the risk measures also 
raise questions about possible errors in estimation and the need to correct the econometric 
specification to address them. 
  Several early papers on compensating differentials used the University of 
Michigan Survey of Working Conditions and Quality of Employment Survey data that 
include several qualitative measures of on-the-job risk.  These measures utilize direct 
surveys of workers and their perceptions of their work environment.  For example, 
Hamermesh (1978), Viscusi (1979, 1980), and Fairris (1989) estimated the hedonic wage 
equation with a dichotomous measure of injury risk based on a worker’s perception of 
whether his or her job is “dangerous.”
7  The survey asked workers if their job exposed 
them to physical dangers or unhealthy conditions.  These studies estimated statistically 
significant coefficients on this “risk” variable in some of the specifications.  Duncan and 
                                                                                                                                                 
20, half of the college-educated described their job risk as “dangerous” while only 19 percent of the less-
than-college educated reported their job risk as such.  This differences in the “danger” cutoff biases 
estimates of risk premiums in wages, and this bias has implications distinct from typical measurement 
error.  Gaba and Viscusi find that subjective quantitative measures of risk yielded wage premiums more 
consistent with estimates based on objective risk measures (BLS).  Analysis of the qualitative risk measure 
(a dichotomous 0-1 “is the job dangerous?” variable) produced a much larger risk premium.     
6 Averaging over a period of 5 to 10 years would likely remove any potential distortions associated with 
catastrophic accidents in any particular year.  
7 Viscusi (1979, 1980) includes the danger variable in some regressions, although his research focused on 
compensating differentials based on BLS measures of injury and fatality risk discussed below.  
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Holmlund (1983) undertook a similar analysis of compensating differentials with a 
“danger” variable in a study of male workers in Sweden.     
  Several papers on the U.S. labor market from the 1970s and early 1980s used 
actuarial data (Thaler and Rosen 1975, Brown 1980, Leigh 1981, Arnould and Nichols 
1983).  These studies all employed a job-related risk measure based on data collected by 
the Society of Actuaries for 1967.  The Society of Actuaries data set provides fatality risk 
data for 37 occupations.  Across these 37 occupations, the annual risk averaged 
approximately 1 in 1,000.  This fatality risk exceeds averages from other data sets by 
nearly an order of magnitude.  To the extent that these data reflect workers in extremely 
high risk jobs, the estimated wage-risk tradeoffs will suffer from a selection bias.  As a 
result, one would expect these estimates to be lower than found in more broadly 
representative samples, which has in fact proven to be the case. 
  Another difficulty is that the Society of Actuaries data do not distinguish fatalities 
caused by the job but rather reflect the overall fatality rates of people within a particular 
job category.  For example, one of the highest risk occupations based on these actuarial 
ratings is actors, who typically face few risks other than unfavorable reviews. 
  Several studies of U.S. and Canadian labor markets have used workers’ 
compensation records to construct risk measures (Butler 1983, Dillingham 1985, Leigh 
1991, Martinello and Meng 1992, Meng 1991, Cousineau et al. 1992, Lanoie et al. 1995).  
Only three studies have used workers’ compensation data to evaluate compensating 
differentials in U.S. labor markets, which may reflect the decentralized nature and 
differences in information collection associated with state (not Federal) management of  
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U.S. workers’ compensation programs.
8   In contrast, researchers in Canada can obtain 
workers’ compensation-based risk data from Labour Canada (the labor ministry for the 
Federal government) and the Quebec government. 
  For analyses of the United States, the majority of the mortality risk studies have 
used data collected by the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  
About 80 percent of the U.S. nonfatal injury risk studies summarized below used BLS 
injury risk data.  The BLS has compiled industry-specific fatality and injury risk data 
since the late 1960s.  Through the early 1990s, BLS collected its data via a survey of 
industries, and reported the data at a fairly aggregated level, such as at the 2-digit and 3-
digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code level.  The aggregation and sampling 
strategy have elicited some concerns about measurement error in the construction of the 
mortality risk variable (see Moore and Viscusi 1988a). 
  Concerns about the BLS fatality risk data led the National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to collect information on fatal occupational 
injuries through its National Traumatic Occupational Fatalities surveillance system 
(NTOF) since 1980.  NIOSH compiles these data from death certificates managed by 
U.S. vital statistics reporting units (NIOSH 2000).  These data are reported at the 1-digit 
SIC code level by state.  Because NIOSH compiles data from a census of death 
certificates, it circumvents some of the concerns about sampling in the pre-1990s BLS 
approach.  Some have raised concerns, however, about the accuracy of reported cause of 
death in death certificates (Dorman and Hagstrom 1998). 
                                                 
8 Leigh’s (1991) analysis with risk data derived from workers’ compensation records in 11 states appears to 
be the only U.S. study to aggregate such data from more than one state.      
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    Comparing the BLS and NIOSH fatality risk data over time provides some 
interesting contrasts.  The original NIOSH data set for the fatality census averaged over 
1980 – 1985 has a mean fatality risk nearly 50 percent higher than a roughly comparable 
BLS data set averaged over 1972 – 1982.
9  Moreover, the BLS data had greater variation 
(a standard deviation 95 percent greater than its mean) than the NTOF data, although the 
NIOSH data also had substantial variation (standard deviation 23 percent greater than its 
mean) (Moore and Viscusi 1988a).     
Since 1992, the BLS has collected fatal occupational injury data through the 
Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI).  The BLS compiles information about 
workplace fatality including worker characteristics and occupation, circumstances of the 
event, and possible equipment involved.  The BLS draws on multiple sources such as 
death certificates, workers’ compensation records, and other Federal and state agency 
reports.  The BLS reports these fatality data by industry at the 4-digit SIC level.  In 
contrast to the earlier comparisons of BLS and NIOSH data, more recent years’ data on 
fatality risk collected through the CFOI now show that the BLS measure includes 
approximately 1,000 more fatalities per year than the NIOSH measure (NIOSH 2000).  
Table 1 illustrates the recent national rates of job-related fatalities at the one-digit 
industry level for the four-year period in which both NIOSH and CFOI data are publicly 
available.  In every instance the BLS measure shows a higher risk mortality rate, which in 
some cases, such as wholesale trade, is quite substantial. 
The risk variables used in several of the non-U.S. studies were based on job-
related accident and mortality data collected by foreign governments.  For example, the 
                                                 
9 Averaging fatality risk data over several years can reduce the distortion of a catastrophic event in one year 
in one industry on the measure of an industry’s risk.  
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data sets used in Shanmugam (1996/7, 1997, 2000, 2001) were from the Office of the 
Chief Inspector of Factories in Madras.  Several of the United Kingdom studies employ 
data provided by the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (Marin and 
Psacharopoulos 1982, Sandy and Elliott 1996, Arabsheibani and Marin 2000) while 
others used unpublished data from the U.K. Health and Safety Executive (Siebert and 
Wei 1994).  In their study of the South Korean labor market, Kim and Fishback (1999) 
obtained their accident data from the Ministry of Labor.  Few of these studies indicate 
whether the mortality risk data were derived from samples or censuses of job-related 
deaths. 
While the large number of studies of labor markets around the world evaluated 
the compensating differential for an on-the-job death and/or on-the-job injury, very few 
attempted to account for the risk of occupational disease.  Lott and Manning (2000) used 
an alternative data set to estimate the risk premium for jobs with higher cancer risk 
associated with occupational exposure to various chemicals (see Section 2).   
1.2.2 Wages and related data.  Labor market studies of the value of risks to life and 
health match these risk measures to data sets on characteristics of wages, workers, and 
employment.  Some researchers survey workers directly to collect this information, such 
as Gegax et al. (1991) for the United States, Lanoie et al. (1995) for Canada, Shanmugam 
(1996/7) for India, and Liu and Hammitt (1999) for Taiwan, among others.  For the 
United States, researchers have also used the University of Michigan’s Survey of 
Working Conditions (SWC), the Quality of Employment Survey (QES), the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey (CPS), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), and decennial census data.  Similar types of surveys undertaken in other  
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countries have also provided the data necessary to undertake hedonic labor market 
analysis, such as the General Household Survey in the United Kingdom (e.g., Siebert and 
Wei 1994 and Arabsheibani and Marin 2000).   
  The dependent variable in virtually all labor market analyses has been a measure 
of the hourly wage.  With some data sets, researchers have had to construct the wage 
measure from weekly or annual labor earnings data.  For some data sets, a worker’s after-
tax wage rate is provided, which can put wage and workers’ compensation benefits in 
comparable terms.  While many studies have included pre-tax wages as the dependent 
variable, this would not likely bias the results significantly so long as workers’ income 
levels and tax rates do not differ substantially.  If the regression model includes workers’ 
compensation benefits, then both the wage and these benefits should be expressed in 
comparable terms (both in after-tax or both in pre-tax terms) to ensure proper evaluation 
of the benefits’ impacts on wages.
10 
Typically, researchers match a given year’s survey data on wages and worker and 
employment characteristics with risk data for that year, or preferably, the average over a 
recent set of years.  Some researchers have restricted their samples to subsets of the 
surveyed working population.  For example, it is common to limit the analysis to full-
time workers, and many have focused only on male, blue-collar workers.  Restricting the 
sample in this manner partially addresses the measurement problem with industry-level 
risk values common to most risk datasets by including only those workers for whom the 
risk data are most pertinent. 
                                                 
10 Most hedonic wage-risk studies have not accounted for labor taxes in their construction of the wage 
variable or in their interpretation of the value of a statistical life.  Exceptions include several papers that 
have focused on the effects of workers’ compensation on the compensating differential for occupational 
risk (e.g., Moore and Viscusi 1990a).  This reflects the more common use of pre-tax wages in the broader 
labor market analysis literature.  
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1.2.3 Wage vs. log(wage).  Most researchers have estimated the wage equation using 
linear and semi-logarithmic specifications.  Choosing a preferred functional form from 
these two specifications cannot be determined on theoretic grounds (see Rosen 1974).  To 
identify the specification with greatest explanatory power, Moore and Viscusi (1988a) 
employed a flexible functional form given by the Box-Cox transformation.  The Box-Cox 
transformation modifies the dependent variable such that the estimated regression model 
takes the form: 
i i i i i i i i i
i H p WC q q p X H
w
ε β γ γ γ β β α
λ
λ
+ ′ + + + + ′ + ′ + =
−
3 3 2 1 2 1
1
. 
This approach presumes that a λ exists such that this model is normally 
distributed, homoskedastic, and linear in the regressors.  Note that the case where λ Æ 0 
represents the semi-logarithmic functional form and the case where λ Æ 1 represents the 
linear functional form.  The flexible form under the Box-Cox transformation can test the 
appropriateness of these two restrictions on the form of the model.  Using maximum 
likelihood methods, Moore and Viscusi’s estimate for λ equaled approximately 0.3 for 
their data.  While this value is more consistent with a semi-logarithmic form than a linear 
form, the authors reject both specifications based on a likelihood ratio test.  The estimated 
value of a statistical life based on the Box-Cox transformed regression model, however, 
differed only slightly from the log(wage) specification.  Shanmugam (1996/7) replicated 
this flexible form evaluation with his evaluation of compensating differentials in India.  
His maximum likelihood estimate for λ equaled approximately 0.2.  While Shanmugam 
rejected the semi-logarithmic and linear models, he found that the semi-logarithmic  
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functional form also generated results closer to those found with the unrestricted flexible 
form.
11 
1.2.4 Errors in variables problem with risk measures.  Every compensating differential 
study employs a less than perfect measure of any particular worker’s job-related fatality 
risk.  The majority of these studies have used fatality risk measures from the BLS 
averaged across the entire industry.  Such an approach, however, suffers from 
measurement error. As noted above, some researchers have found that the pre-1992 BLS 
data sets (and NIOSH data sets to a lesser extent) suffer from incomplete reporting.  The 
industry averages constructed by the BLS do not exactly reflect realized industry 
averages.  Further, applying industry averages to individuals may result in errors 
associated with matching workers to industries due to response error in worker surveys.  
Mellow and Sider (1983) evaluated several surveys that asked workers and their 
employers to identify the workers’ industry and occupation (among other questions).  In 
their assessment of the January 1977 Current Population Survey, 84 percent of workers 
and their employers agreed on industry affiliation at the three-digit SIC code level while 
only 58 percent agreed on the three-digit occupational status.  Merging a worker 
characteristics data set with a risk measure data set based on industry affiliation (or 
occupation status) can result in a mismatch of worker characteristics and industry risk.  
Mellow and Sider’s statistical analysis of the 16 percent “mismatched” workers by 
industry affiliation showed that the errors in matching reduced the compensating 
differential for injury risk by about 50 percent in their samples. 
                                                 
11 In the product market context, Atkinson and Halvorsen (1990), Dreyfus and Viscusi (1995), and Gayer, 
Hamilton, and Viscusi (2000) employ Box-Cox transformations to evaluate their respective hedonic price 
models (the first two focused on automobile prices and the third on housing prices).  
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Even with a perfect industry measure of fatality risk and appropriate matching of 
workers and their industry, measurement error still exists since some workers bear risk 
that differs from their industry’s average.  For example, different occupations within an 
industry may pose different levels of risk.  This measurement error can be characterized 
as: 
i i i p p η + =
* , 
where pi reflects the observed industry average fatality risk, pi* reflects the unobserved 
(to the econometrician) fatality risk associated with worker i’s job, and ηi reflects the 
deviation of that job’s risk from the industry average.  Random measurement error will 
result in a downward bias on coefficient estimates, and the least squares estimate of the 
coefficient on fatality risk in this example would be inconsistent: 
1 2 2
2

















where the signal-noise ratio determines the extent of the downward bias towards zero. 
  In addition to the downward effect on the risk coefficient, applying industry-level 
risk data to individual observations may also induce some correlation in the residuals 
among individuals within industries.  Robust (White) standard errors would not 
appropriately correct for this correlation and result in inappropriately small standard 
errors.  Hersch (1998) and Viscusi and Hersch (2001) employ robust standard errors 
correcting for within-group (within-industry) correlation. 
1.2.5 Omitted variables bias and endogeneity.  Failing to capture all of the determinants 
of a worker’s wage in a hedonic wage equation may result in biased results if the 
unobserved variables are correlated with observed variables.  Dangerous jobs are often  
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unpleasant in other respects.  Omission of non-pecuniary characteristics of a job may bias 
the estimated risk premium if an omitted variable is correlated with risk.  For example, 
one may find a correlation between injury risk and physical exertion required for a job or 
risk and environmental factors such as noise, heat, or odor.  While some studies have 
attempted to control for these unobservables by including industry or occupation dummy 
variables (see below), a model may still suffer from omitted variables bias. 
  Several studies have explored how omitting injury risk affects the estimation of 
mortality risk.  Viscusi (1981) found that omitting injury risk resulted in a positive bias in 
the mortality risk measure for union affiliated workers.   Cousineau et al. (1992) also 
found that omitting injury risk may cause a positive bias in the estimation of the 
coefficient on mortality risk.  The high correlation (collinearity) between injury and 
mortality risks, however, can make joint estimation difficult.  Some studies have 
attempted to estimate regression equations with both types of risk and have found non-
significant coefficients on at least one of the measures, including Smith (1976), Leigh 
(1981), Dillingham and Smith (1984), and Kniesner and Leeth (1991). 
  While including injury risk in a regression model could address concern about one 
omitted variable, other possible influences on wages that could be correlated with 
mortality risk may not be easily measured.  Several papers have investigated this bias.  
Garen (1988) notes that “individuals may systematically differ in unobserved 
characteristics which affect their productivity and earnings in dangerous jobs and so these 
unobservables will affect their choice of job risk” (p. 9).  One example Garen offers is 
“coolheadedness,” which may make a worker more productive under the stresses of a 
dangerous job but may not be relevant in a safe job.  In this case, an econometrician  
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would prefer to include both the mortality risk variable and the interaction or the 
mortality risk variable with a variable measuring coolheadedness as regressors in the 
hedonic labor market model.  Failing to include this interaction term results in biased 
least squares estimation.  Garen attempts to address this concern with an instrumental 
variables technique, although subsequent researchers such as Hwang et al. (1992) have 
noted the difficulty in identifying appropriate instruments for his procedure.  Employing 
this instrumental variables technique, Garen found a mortality risk premium about double 
what the standard least squares model produced.     
  The significant increase in the risk premium associated with a method to account 
for unobserved productivity is consistent with the theoretical and simulation findings in 
Hwang et al. (1992).  They estimate that for plausible parameter estimates, models that 
fail to account for heterogeneity in unobserved productivity may bias estimates of the risk 
premium by about 50 percent and could result in incorrectly (negative) signing of the risk 
variable.  With the exception of some non-union samples in several studies (e.g., Dorsey 
1983 and Dickens 1984), the empirical literature presents very little evidence of this 
wrong signing.  Siebert and Wei (1994) have also found that accounting for the 
endogeneity of risk can increase the risk premium compared to a standard least squares 
approach.  Recent theoretical research, however, has also illustrated the potential for 
over-estimating the risk premium by failing to control for unobservables (Shogren and 
Stamland 2002).  They note that workers with the ability to avoid injury select into risky 
jobs while those less able to avoid injury (“clumsy” workers) select into less-risky jobs.  
They argue that risk premiums could be overestimated by a factor of four with plausible 
parameter estimates in their simulations.  Whether there will be such biases hinges on the  
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monitorability of individual’s safety-related productivity.  If these differences are 
monitorable, as in Viscusi and Hersch (2001), there will be a separating compensating 
differential equilibrium for workers of different riskiness. 
  Viscusi and Hersch (2001) note that differences in workers’ preferences over risk 
can affect the shape of their indifference curves and workers’ safety behavior and, by 
affecting firms’ cost to supply safety, can influence firms’ offer curves.  They evaluated 
the wage-risk (injury) tradeoff of workers with a data set that includes measures of risk 
preferences (e.g., smoking status) and measures of workers’ prior accident history.  While 
smokers work, on average, in industries with higher injury risk than non-smokers, 
smokers also are more likely to have a work-related injury controlling for industry risk.  
Smokers also are more prone to have had a recent non-work-related accident.  As a result, 
Viscusi and Hersch find that nonsmokers receive a greater risk premium in their wages 
than do smokers because the safety effect flattens smokers’ offer curves enough to offset 
smokers’ preferences for greater wages at higher risk levels.   
  To address potential omitted variable bias arising from differences in worker 
characteristics, employing a panel data set could allow one to difference out or dummy 
out individual-specific unobservables, so long as these are constant throughout the time 
period covered by the panel.  Unfortunately, very few data sets exist that follow a set of 
workers over a period of several years.  Brown (1980) used the National Longitudinal 
Study Young Men’s sample over 1966 – 1973 (excluding 1972) with the Society of 
Actuaries mortality risk data.  While he reported results that were not consistent with the 
theory of compensating differentials for a variety of nonpecuniary aspects of 
employment, he did estimate a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the  
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mortality risk variable.  Brown noted that his estimate of the risk premium was nearly 
three times the size of the estimate in Thaler and Rosen (1975), which first used the 
Society of Actuaries mortality risk data. 
1.2.6 Compensating differentials for risk or inter-industry wage differentials.  Several 
recent papers have claimed that estimates of risk premiums in this kind of wage 
regression analysis actually reflect industry wage premiums because the fatality risk 
variables typically reflect industry-level risk  (Leigh 1995, Dorman and Hagstrom 1998).  
Both Leigh and Dorman and Hagstrom evaluate the proposition that risk premiums 
simply reflect industry premiums by comparing compensating differential models 
without dummy variables for industry affiliation of each worker with models that include 
such dummy variables.   
Their claim that industry premiums mask as risk premiums in these wage 
regressions suffers from several deficiencies.  First, a large number of studies have 
included industry dummy variables in their statistical analyses and found significant 
compensating differentials for risk.  For example, the first wage-risk tradeoff study by 
Smith (1974) employed six industry dummies and yielded a statistically significant 
compensating differential for risk.  Viscusi (1978a) included 25 industry dummy 
variables in his analysis based on the Survey of Working Conditions danger variable (0, 
1 variable reflecting a worker’s subjective perception of on-the-job risk), although he 
excluded the dummy variables from the analysis based on the industry-level BLS risk 
data.
12  In both sets of analyses, danger and the BLS risk measure were statistically 
significant and generated very similar estimates of the risk premium.  Freeman and 
                                                 
12 Viscusi (1978a) excluded the dummy variables out of concern of inducing multicollinearity between an 




Medoff (1981) found a statistically significant risk premium in their analyses that 
included 20 industry dummy variables and the BLS injury rate measure.  In their 
evaluation of the U.K. labor market with an occupational mortality risk variable, Marin 
and Psacharopoulos (1982) found a statistically significant risk coefficient while their 
SIC code dummies were insignificant.  Dickens (1984) estimated regression models with 
the BLS fatality risk measure and 20 industry dummy variables (1- and 2-digit SIC code 
industries).  For the union sample, he found a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient on risk.  Leigh and Folsum (1984) included 2-digit SIC code industry dummy 
variables in their wage regressions, and they found statistically significant coefficients on 
mortality risk in all eight mortality risk models reported.  Dillingham (1985) estimated 
regression models with industry dummy variables (at the 1-digit SIC code level) and 
without.  In both cases, he found statistically significant and positive coefficients on his 
measure of mortality risk.  Moreover, the coefficients were virtually identical (0.0023 vs. 
0.0022), although the standard error was higher for the model with industry dummy 
variables (perhaps related to risk-industry dummy variable collinearity).   Cousineau et al. 
(1992) included 29 industry variables in their evaluation of the Canadian labor market 
that estimated statistically significant coefficients on both injury and mortality risks.  Lott 
and Manning (2000) included 13 industry dummy variables in their evaluation of long-
term cancer risks in U.S. labor markets, and found a statistically significant risk premium 
based on industry-level measures of carcinogen exposure. 
Second, inserting industry dummy variables into the regression equation induces 
multicollinearity with the risk variable.  Previous researchers such as Viscusi (1979) have 
noted this as well.  Hamermesh and Wolfe (1990) employed dummy variables for five  
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major industries in their analysis of injury risk on wages.  They note that a finer 
breakdown by industry could be used.  A complete set of dummy variables at the 3-digit 
SIC code level, however, would completely eliminate all variation in the injury risk 
variable, which is measured at the 3-digit SIC code level (p. S183).  While 
multicollinearity does not affect the consistency of the parameter estimates, it will 
increase standard errors. 
  This induced multicollinearity is also evident in the Dorman and Hagstrom results 
for the models using NIOSH fatality risk data.
13  Dorman and Hagstrom interact the 
NIOSH fatality risk measure by a dummy variable for union status (and for non-union 
status in the second set of regressions).  Contrary to their hypothesis, including industry 
dummy variables does not reduce the coefficient in the union-risk interaction models.  
Inducing multicollinearity does depress the t-statistics slightly, although not enough to 
render the coefficients statistically insignificant.  The models with the non-union-risk 
interaction reflect the induced multicollinearity, as the t-statistics fall below levels 
typically associated with statistical significance moving from the standard model to the 
industry dummy model.  While the coefficients in these industry dummy-augmented 
models fall from their levels in the standard models, they are not statistically different 
from the standard models’ coefficients.  Based on the NIOSH fatality risk data, the 
Dorman and Hagstrom results appear to illustrate that including collinear regressors 
                                                 
13 We focus our discussion here on their NIOSH data-based results for several reasons.  First, we believe 
that the NIOSH data are superior to the 1980s BLS fatality risk data as discussed above.  Second, the 
regression models based on non-NIOSH data in Dorman and Hagstrom have insignificant risk coefficients 
for all specifications – without industry dummy variables, with industry dummy variables, and with other 
industry characteristics.  While we are not certain why they did not find significant risk coefficients with 
the BLS risk data as previous researchers had, it seems moot to argue that a coefficient on a risk variable 
actually represents an industry effect if that coefficient is not significant.  
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(industry variables) can increase standard errors but not significantly affect the 
magnitudes of the parameter estimates. 
 
2. The value of a statistical life based on U.S. labor market studies 
  The value of a statistical life should not be considered a universal constant or 
some “right number” that researchers aim to infer from market evidence.  Rather, the 
VSL reflects the wage-risk tradeoffs that reflect the preferences of workers in a given 
sample.  Moreover, transferring the estimates of a value of a statistical life to non-labor 
market contexts, as is the case in benefit-cost analyses of environmental health policies 
for example, should recognize that different populations have different preferences over 
risks and different values on life-saving.  If people face continuous safety choices in a 
variety of contexts, however, the same individual should exhibit the same risk-money 
tradeoff across different contexts, provided the character of the risks is the same.   
Researchers have undertaken more than 30 studies of compensating differentials for risk 
in the U.S. labor market.  Some studies have evaluated the wage-risk tradeoff for the 
entire labor force, while others have focused on subsamples such as specific occupations 
(e.g., police officers in Low and McPheters 1983), specific states (e.g., South Carolina in 
Butler 1983), blue-collar workers only (e.g., Dorman and Hagstrom 1998 and Fairris 
1989), males only (e.g., Berger and Gabriel 1991), and union members only (e.g., 
Dillingham and Smith 1984).  These hedonic labor market studies also vary in terms of 
their choice of mortality risk variable, which can significantly influence the estimation of 
a value of a statistical life (for comparison of NIOSH and BLS data, refer to Moore and 
Viscusi 1988a and Dorman and Hagstrom 1998).    
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  Table 2 summarizes the estimated VSLs for the U.S. labor market from the 
literature over the past three decades.
14  Because some studies provided multiple 
estimates, in these instances we provide illustrative results based on the principal 
specification in the analysis.  Table 2 provides a sense of the magnitude and range of U.S. 
labor market VSLs and illustrates the influence of factors such as income and the 
magnitude of risk exposure as well as specification issues such as including nonfatal 
injury risk and worker’s compensation.
15   
  Viscusi (1993) reported that most surveyed studies fall within a $3.8 - $9.0 
million range, when converted into year 2000 dollars.
 16, 17  While we include more 
papers from the United States as well as findings from other countries, the general 
conclusion remains unchanged.  Half of the studies of the U.S. labor market reveal a 
value of a statistical life range from $5 million to $12 million.  Estimates below the $5 
million value tend to come from studies that used the Society of Actuaries data, which 
                                                 
14 We selected papers for inclusion in this literature review with a modest set of criteria.  First, a study 
should be written in English.  Second, a study should be published in either an academic journal or a book.  
Third, a study should provide enough information to calculate a value of a statistical life.  In several cases, 
information provided in more recent papers (such as per capita incomes reported for some studies in 
Viscusi 1993 and Mrozek and Taylor 2002) has been used with reported coefficient estimates to calculate 
the value of a statistical life for a study.  Our aim is to characterize as best as possible the universe of wage-
risk studies in the literature, so we have not attempted to purge this assessment of so-called “low quality” 
studies or to modify the value of a statistical life estimates from such studies.  For some studies, we have 
presented a range of the value of a statistical life estimates and for others we have presented an illustrative 
point estimate.  In the case of the latter, we have focused on the reported results for the whole sample (as 
opposed to union-only, blue-collar only, managerial-only, etc. samples) based on the econometric 
specification preferred by the studies’ authors.     
15 While these estimates have been adjusted to constant year dollars (2000 US$), they have not been 
adjusted for differences in the samples’ income levels.  The per capita income data provided in Table 2 
coupled with income elasticity estimates in Section 6 can be used to modify the values of a statistical life in 
Table 2 so that they reflect a common income level. 
16 In this paper, we present all VSLs in terms of 2000 US$.  All domestic values are converted using the 
CPI-U deflator series (Council of Economic Advisers 2002 Table B60).  International conversions are 
made using purchasing power parity exchange rates from the Penn World Table 6.0 (see Summers and 
Heston 1991, Aten et al. 2001, and Internet: http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu) and then converted to year 2000 
dollars with the CPI-U deflator series. 
17 Viscusi (1993) actually reports $3 – $7 million in December 1990 US$.  This has served as a reference 




tends to reflect workers who have self-selected themselves into jobs that are an order of 
magnitude riskier than the average.  Many of the studies yielding estimates beyond $12 
million used structural methods that did not estimate the wage-risk tradeoff directly or 
were derived from studies in which the authors reported unstable estimates of the value of 
a statistical life.  Our median estimated VSL from Table 2 is about $7 million, which is in 
line with the estimates from the studies that we regard as most reliable.  In terms of 
methodology, we are more confident in the results presented in Viscusi (1978a, 1979), 
which include the most extensive set of non-pecuniary characteristics variables to explain 
workers’ wages, and the results presented in Moore and Viscusi (1988a), which include 
the NIOSH mortality risk data in lieu of the pre-1992 BLS mortality risk data.   
A salient research issue of policy importance is the effect of income levels on the 
wage-risk tradeoff.  For example, Hamermesh (1999) notes that as wage inequality has 
increased over the last several decades, so have on-the-job mortality risks diverged.  He 
notes that workplace safety is highly income-elastic.  This result is related to the findings 
in Viscusi (1978b) that the value of a statistical life is increasing in worker wealth.   
Similarly, Viscusi and Evans (1990) have estimated the income elasticity of the value of 
statistical job injury risks to be 0.6 to 1.0.  The effect of income on the wage-risk tradeoff 
is evident in a historical evaluation of employment risks as well.  Kim and Fishback 
(1993) estimated compensating differentials for mortality risk in the railroad industry 
over the period 1893 – 1909 and found implicit values of statistical life on the order of 
$150,000 in today’s dollars.
18  Our meta-analysis below examines the role of income 
differences in generating the variation in VSL estimates.   
                                                 
18 Also refer to Fishback and Kantor (1992) for a historical evaluation of compensating differentials for 
occupational risk in the late 19th century.   
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  While most hedonic labor market studies focus on the risk of accidental death or 
accidental injury, several papers have attempted to explore the effect of occupational 
disease.  Lott and Manning (2000) evaluated the effect of carcinogen exposure on 
workers’ wages within the context of changing employer liability laws.  In lieu of the 
standard mortality risk measures, the authors employ the Hickey and Kearney carcinogen 
index, which represents worker carcinogen exposure at the 2-digit SIC code level.
19  
They find that workers’ wages reflect a risk premium for carcinogen exposure.  Lott and 
Manning convert their results into a value of a statistical life assuming that the index is a 
proportional representation of the actual probability of getting occupational-related 
cancer, that 10 – 20 percent of all cancer deaths result from occupational exposures, and 
that the probability of a worker getting cancer ranges from 0.04 to 0.08 percent per year.  
We have modified their reported VSL range to account for a latency period.
20  Based on 
these assumptions, the authors estimate that the value of a statistical life based on 
occupational cancer would range from $1.5 – $3.0 million.  Assuming that occupational 
cancers, however, comprise a smaller fraction of all cancer deaths would increase the 
implicit VSL.
21 
                                                 
19 Smith (1983) also used the Hickey and Kearney carcinogen exposure index to complement his 
assessment of compensating differentials for injury risk in U.S. labor markets.  He found that the index is 
significantly positively correlated with wages implying a risk premium for workers’ operating in 
environments exposing them to more carcinogens.  Further, Smith included a measure of total suspended 
particulates (TSP) based on the workers’ locations and found a statistically significant and positive 
correlation between TSP and workers’ wages.  Since TSP has been linked with various respiratory diseases, 
this could illustrate another premium for workers’ bearing long-term risks on the job. 
20 The values we report reflect an assumed latency period of 10 years and a real discount rate of 3 percent.  
Note that the VSL estimates in parentheses in Table 2 represent the values reported by Lott and Manning.  
Employing a real discount rate of 7 percent, consistent with U.S. Office of Management and Budget (1992) 
guidance, over a 10-year period effectively reduces the VSL reported by Lott and Manning in half. 
21 Meng (1991) attempted to account for occupational disease by including a variable that reflected the rate 
of heart attacks and industrial disease.  However, very modest information about the basis for this variable 
is provided.  It is difficult to discern whether the variable captures long-term work-related risks or simply a 
selection effect that contaminates the data like the Society of Actuaries data set.  
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  Several early papers in the literature did not find statistically significant 
compensating differentials for on-the-job mortality risk.  For example, Leigh (1981) 
estimated a risk premium for injuries but not for fatalities.  Dorsey (1983) likewise did 
not find a mortality-based risk premium.  The Leigh study coupled the Society of 
Actuaries mortality data with BLS injury data.  The combination of greater measurement 
error in the data and the high correlation between injury risks and mortality risks 
probably led to the insignificance of the mortality risk variable.  The Dorsey study uses 
industry-level averages, instead of worker-specific values, as its unit of observation.  This 
averaging across industry for wages and related explanatory variables may have reduced 
the variation necessary to discern the effects of job-specific influences on wage, such as 
job risk.   
  More recent papers by Leigh (1995) and Dorman and Hagstrom (1998) also do 
not find compensating differentials in many model specifications.  As discussed above, 
we do not find their inter-industry wage differential discussion compelling.  Nevertheless, 
Table 2 includes their results based on the NIOSH data with industry dummy variables.
22  
  Some of these analyses of U.S. labor markets investigated the potential 
heterogeneity in the risk preferences of workers in the labor force in which there is 
worker sorting by level of risk.  The empirical issue is whether the wage-risk tradeoff 
takes a linear or concave shape.  A linear form would imply that an incremental increase 
of risk in the labor market requires a proportional increase in the wage differential.  A 
concave form, however, would imply a less than proportional increase in the wage 
differential, perhaps reflecting sorting by workers based on their risk preferences.   
                                                 
22 The authors also report estimates using the less reliable pre-1992 BLS risk data.  
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To evaluate the shape of this tradeoff, one can modify the wage equation 
regression model to include both mortality risk and the square of mortality risk.  If the 
latter term is not significant, then the wage-risk tradeoff is linear for the range of risks 
and wages covered by the study’s sample.  If the squared term is significant and negative, 
then the wage-risk tradeoff takes a concave form.  Viscusi (1981), Olson (1981), Dorsey 
and Walzer (1983), and Leigh and Folsum (1984) all found evidence that the risk-wage 
tradeoff curve is concave.
23  All four studies include regression models with a quadratic 
representation of mortality risk.   
Figure 2 illustrates how the value of a statistical life varies with mortality risk for 
a sample of six regression models from these four papers.  Viscusi (1981; linear) and 
Leigh and Folsum (L&F 1984; linear) represent regression models where the dependent 
variable is the hourly wage while the other four lines represent regression models with 
the logarithm of the wage as the dependent variable.  All six models include measures of 
nonfatal injury risks (probability of a lost-workday accident and, in some cases, duration 
of lost-workday accident).  The slopes of the risk-VSL lines in this figure are similar 
within the wage-specification type where the wage-based models appear to have a steeper 
tradeoff than do the logarithm of wage-based models (with the exception of the Dorsey 
and Walzer model, although this may reflect the fact that the sample in their study faced 
mortality risks 2 to 3 times smaller on average than the samples in the other studies).  
Based on these models, populations of individuals who select into jobs with very minor 
risks (e.g., on the order of 1 in 100,000) have implicit values of statistical life ranging 
from $12 to $22 million.  Increasing the risk ten-fold, to levels that are close to the mean 
                                                 
23 Siebert and Wei (1998) found a concave wage-risk relationship with a risk and risk-squared specification 
for their analysis of the Hong Kong labor market.  Meng and Smith (1990, 1999) also found the same 
relationship in their assessments of the Canadian labor market.  
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mortality risks in these studies, modestly reduces the VSL into the range of $10 to $18 
million.  Figure 2 illustrates that very high risks result in small values of statistical lives, 
although caution should be exercised when considering extrapolations beyond the 
samples’ ranges. 
 
3. Evidence of the value of a statistical life from U.S. housing and product markets  
  Housing and product market decisions also reflect individual tradeoffs between 
mortality risk and money.  The main methodological difference is that economists 
typically estimate a hedonic price equation rather than a hedonic wage equation.  The 
underlying theory is essentially the same, as comparison of Rosen (1974) with the wage 
equation analysis above will indicate. 
  Table 3 presents the results from ten studies that evaluated the price-risk tradeoffs 
for seatbelt use, cigarette smoking, home fire detectors, automobile safety, bicycle 
helmets, and housing price responses to hazardous waste site risks.
24  The studies in 
general find an implicit value of a statistical life on the same order of magnitude as the 
labor market studies, although they tend to be a little lower. 
The lower estimates may reflect several characteristics of these studies that 
distinguish them from the labor market studies.  First, some product decisions do not 
provide a continuum of price-risk opportunities (unlike the labor market that does offer a 
fairly continuous array of wage-risk employment options) but rather a discrete safety 
decision.  For example, Dardis’ (1980) evaluation of smoke detectors represents such a 
                                                 
24 All these studies evaluate risk-income tradeoffs in the United States.  In our survey of the literature, we 
found only one study focusing on behavior outside of the United States. Ghosh, Lees, and Seal (1975) 
study the tradeoff between highway speeds and mortality risk in the United Kingdom.  They derive a value 
of a statistical life estimate of $0.9 million.  
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discrete choice.  In such a case, the consumer’s decision to purchase a smoke detector 
reveals only the lower bound on the willingness to pay for the reduced risk.  Similarly, 
the study by Jenkins, Owens, and Wiggins (2001) examines the purchase of bicycle 
helmets.  It is interesting, however, that their results show VSLs increasing over the first 
half of the life cycle. 
Second, the types of products considered in some studies may induce selection 
based on risk preferences.  For example, the low estimated VSL for cigarette smokers 
found by Ippolito and Ippolito (1984) presumably reflects the non-random character of 
the smoking population.  Their research focuses on cigarette smokers, and they estimate a 
VSL lower than from most product market studies.  The lower VSL is consistent with the 
findings in Hersch and Viscusi (1990) and Viscusi and Hersch (2001) who find that 
individuals who engage in risky behaviors, such as cigarette smoking and driving without 
seatbelts, have lower implicit values for injury than do those who do not engage in such 
behavior. 
  Third, several studies are based on inferred, instead of observed, price-risk 
tradeoffs.  Consider the seat belt and child seat studies by Blomquist (1979) and Carlin 
and Sandy (1991).  In these studies, drivers’ or occupants’ safety is traded off with the 
time to secure a seat belt or a child seat.  The authors assume a given time cost – for 
example, Blomquist assumes that it takes 8 seconds to secure a seat belt.  Then this time 
is monetized at the individual’s wage rate.  Unlike labor market studies where the 
monetary value of the attribute in question (job wage) is observed, these studies do not 
observe the actual time drivers take to buckle their seat belts.  Moreover, they do not 
account for other aspects of seat belt use, such as the costs of discomfort of wearing a  
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seatbelt, which would increase the implicit valuation of a statistical life derived by this 
methodology.   
  The studies focused on automobile purchases and home purchases do not suffer 
from the need to infer the monetary component of the price-risk tradeoff.  For example, 
Atkinson and Halvorsen (1990) and Dreyfus and Viscusi (1995) evaluate the risk-price 
tradeoff for automobiles.  They construct hedonic price models very similar to the 
hedonic wage models used in labor market analyses.  Both studies include car purchase 
price (annual average for a given model) as the dependent variable and an array of 
automobile attributes as explanatory variables, such as vehicle size, power, reliability, 
fuel economy, and safety (fatal accident rate).  Just as in the labor market hedonic studies, 
the coefficient on the safety variable in these automobile price hedonic studies reveals the 
price-risk tradeoff.  Automobile purchases should be less likely to suffer the selection 
bias of the cigarette smoking study or the discreteness in decision of the fire alarm study.   
  Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi (2000) evaluate the tradeoff between housing prices 
and cancer risk associated with hazardous waste sites.  The authors develop a housing 
hedonic price model, similar in form to the labor market hedonic studies.  The dependent 
variable is the price of a house sold over a five-year period in the greater Grand Rapids, 
MI area, and explanatory variables include house characteristics such as number of 
bedrooms and bathrooms, neighborhood characteristics, property tax rates, measures of 
proximity to a Superfund hazardous waste site, and calculated cancer risk associated with 
exposure from the nearest hazardous site.  The VSL interpretation from this study is 
analogous to that of Lott and Manning (2000).  The hedonic price model generates the 
value of avoiding a statistical cancer case, which may not necessarily reflect the value of  
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a statistical life to the extent that some cancers are treatable.  If housing decisions are 
made based on the expectation that cancers associated with hazardous waste site exposure 
are terminal, then this price-risk tradeoff can be considered comparable to a VSL.
25   
 
4. The value of a statistical life based on non-U.S. labor market studies 
  While about 25 wage-risk studies of the U.S. labor market were published in the 
1970s and 1980s, only three studies on non-U.S. labor markets appeared in the literature 
during this period.  We have identified another 19 labor market hedonic studies in both 
developed and developing countries outside of the U.S. context published since 1990.  
The studies presented in Table 4 include evaluations of wage-risk tradeoffs in labor 
markets in Australia, Austria, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom.  More recent 
work in developing countries has focused on Asia, including analyses of labor markets in 
Hong Kong, India, South Korea, and Taiwan.   
  Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982) undertook the first hedonic labor market 
analysis of job risks outside of the United States in their study of the U.K. labor market.  
Based on wage and risk data from the 1970s, they found a value of a statistical life of 
about $3.5 million.  Arabsheibani and Marin (2000) sought to replicate the earlier Marin 
and Psacharopoulos analysis for the United Kingdom.  By employing a similar 
methodology and more recent wage and risk data from the same sources as in the original 
study, the authors evaluated the stability of VSL estimates over time.  They found, 
consistent with other studies of the U.K. labor market during the 1980s, a higher value of 
a statistical life than did Marin and Psacharopoulos.  While the evaluation of the whole 
                                                 
25 We have discounted the reported VSLs assuming that homeowners perceive a 10-year latency period and 
use a 3 percent discount rate in making their housing decisions.  
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U.K. labor force yielded a relatively large VSL of about $18 million, regression analyses 
of subsamples resulted in VSLs ranging up to $68 million (in this case, for non-manual 
workers).  While this result qualitatively conforms to the U.S. findings of lower VSLs for 
workers in higher risk jobs (see Figure 2), the magnitude of the U.K. compensating 
differentials seems implausibly large. 
The results from several of the studies of the United Kingdom reveal 
compensating differentials on the order of 10 percent of total worker wage income.  One 
regression result (with a VSL of $63 million) from Sandy and Elliott (1996) implies a 
compensating differential for mortality risk comprising nearly 20 percent of worker 
wages.  These risk premia are substantially larger than the compensating differentials 
evident in other developed countries’ labor markets, even those countries with higher per 
capita incomes.  Moreover, risk levels cannot account for the high wage share of 
compensating differentials as the mortality risk is lower than in many U.S. studies.  The 
large U.K. compensating differentials may reflect correlation between the risk measure 
and other unobservables that yield substantial returns to the worker. 
  After the United States, no country has been the focus of more hedonic labor 
market analyses of wage-risk tradeoffs than Canada.  The Canadian studies appear to 
produce compensating differentials more in line with the U.S. experience than with the 
evidence from the U.K. labor market.  With the exception of the Lanoie, Pedro, and 
LaTour (1995), most Canadian labor market VSLs fall within the range of $3 – $6 
million.  The Lanoie et al. findings of a VSL on the order of $18 million – $20 million 
may reflect their data collection methodology.  They surveyed about 200 workers in the 
Montreal area and solicited workers’ perceptions of risk with a risk information ladder  
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similar to that in Gegax et al. (1991), which suffered from using a truncated job risk scale 
that omitted most job risks in the U.S. economy.  Analyses by Lanoie et al. with industry 
risk measures provided by the Quebec Compensation Board did not yield statistically 
significant risk coefficients, while the perceived risk measures generated these large 
VSLs.  This result contrasts with the findings of Cousineau, Lacroix, and Girard (1992) 
who found a statistically significant compensating differential for risk using mortality 
risk data from the same source on a sample of more than 30,000 Quebec workers.   
  With the exception of some U.K. studies, the compensating differentials estimated 
in developed country analyses tend to find risk premiums ranging between 1 – 2 percent 
of labor income.  These results are broadly consistent with the findings in the Duncan and 
Holmlund (1983) that used Swedish workers’ perceptions of danger in lieu of measured 
industry mortality risks.  The authors estimated a statistically significant and positive 
compensating wage differential for dangerous jobs on the order of about 2 percent of 
wages.  Swedish workers’ perceptions of danger yield comparable compensating 
differentials to measured industry mortality risk in both U.S. and European studies (see 
Viscusi 1979 for an example from the U.S. labor market).  
  Researchers have also evaluated the VSL in several of the newly industrialized 
countries of Asia, including Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan.  Note that these 
countries have on-the-job mortality risks three to five times greater than the average in 
Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom.  Further, the average worker 
earnings are two to four times lower than labor earnings in developed countries.   
Kim and Fishback (1999) examined the South Korean labor market over the 1984 
– 1990 period.  Unlike many of the studies in developed countries, which employ worker- 
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level data, their unit of observation is at the industry level.  Kim and Fishback estimate a 
VSL of approximately $0.5 million.  They note that the estimated VSL is about 94 times 
the average annual earnings of workers.  Siebert and Wei (1998) estimate a VSL for the 
Hong Kong workforce that is larger than the Korean estimate by about a factor of three.  
The ratio of VSL to average annual earnings for Hong Kong is about 150.  These 
estimates are of the same order of magnitude as the ratio of VSL to annual earnings 
evident in the U.S. labor market.   
  Liu, Hammitt, and Liu (1997) and Liu and Hammitt (1999) estimated the wage-
risk tradeoff in Taiwan.  The Liu, Hammitt, and Liu study focuses on all non-agricultural 
workers while Liu and Hammitt base their analysis on in-person surveys of petrochemical 
workers.  In the former case, the authors use 3-digit industry level risk data, while the 
latter paper uses workers’ risk perceptions derived from a survey instrument similar to 
that in Gegax et al. (1991).  Workers’ risk perceptions in the petrochemical industry yield 
a mortality risk rate about 35 percent greater than the rate published by the Taiwan Labor 
Insurance Agency, the data source for the Liu, Hammitt, and Liu study.
26  W h i l e  
petrochemical workers face higher average mortality risk (perceived and measured) than 
the average for all non-agricultural workers in Taiwan, the higher wages and income 
associated with petrochemical workers in 1995 relative to the broader workforce in the 
early to mid 1980s probably explains why Liu and Hammitt estimated a VSL about twice 
what Liu, Hammitt, and Liu found. 
  Estimates for the Indian labor market yield a value of a statistical life greater than 
the VSLs in other developing countries despite the fact that per capita income in India is 
                                                 
26 The difference between the mean subjective mortality risk and the objective mortality risk reported by 
the Taiwan Labor Insurance Agency is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
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an order of magnitude smaller than in these countries.  Shanmugam (1996/1997, 1997, 
2000, 2001) assessed the wage-risk tradeoff in a variety of studies using survey data of 
manufacturing workers in Madras, India in 1990.  The VSL estimates from these studies 
range by nearly a factor of four, even though they reflect the same wage and risk data, 
illustrating how a variety of econometric specifications can produce in some cases a 
range of results. 
 
5. The implicit value of a statistical injury: U.S. and international estimates 
  Complementing the research on the returns to bearing fatal risks in the workplace, 
a significant number of studies have evaluated the risk premium associated with bearing 
nonfatal job risks.  The hedonic labor market studies of nonfatal risk employ the same 
econometric approach as used for mortality risk.  As discussed above, some studies that 
attempt to estimate jointly the effects of fatal and nonfatal risks on workers’ wages do not 
find significant effects of risk on wages for at least one of the risk measures.  Fatal risk is 
highly correlated with nonfatal risk, so joint estimation may result in large standard errors 
due to collinearity.  Omitting one of these variables when estimating the other could 
result in an upwardly biased estimate of the return to that type of risk. 
  Table 5 summarizes 31 studies from the U.S. labor market (Table 5a) and 7 
studies of labor markets outside of the United States (Table 5b) that have found 
statistically significant influences of nonfatal job risk on wages.  These studies employ 
three different measures of nonfatal job risks: the overall injury rate, the rate of injuries 
severe enough to result in a lost workday, and the rate of total lost workdays.  Studies 
using different measures of nonfatal job risks will generate different risk premiums  
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because the return to the frequency of injuries (the injury rate) will usually differ from the 
return to the severity of injuries (lost workdays rate).  In two studies with specialized 
data, Butler (1983) constructed an injury rate from South Carolina workers’ 
compensation claims, restricting his risk measure to only the more serious work accidents 
and French and Kendall (1992) and French (1990) constructed an injury rate for railroad 
workers based on data collected by the Federal Railroad Administration.  As an 
alternative to these objective measures of risk, Viscusi and O’Connor (1984) and Hersch 
and Viscusi (1990) used workers’ own assessments of risk with risk scales based on the 
BLS injury rate and the BLS lost workday accident rate, respectively.   These authors 
estimated comparable wage-risk tradeoffs based on subjective risk perception as the other 
studies based on objectively measured industry-level risk.  
  These value of statistical injury studies yield a wide range of estimates, reflecting 
both the differences in the risk measures used as well as whether mortality risk is 
included in the results.  While several studies have very high values of injury, such as 
McLean, Wendling, and Neergaard (1978), Leigh and Folsum (1984), and Biddle and 
Zarkin (1988), most studies have estimates in the range of $20,000 – $70,000 per injury.   
The value of statistical injury appears to vary with workers’ preferences over risk, 
consistent with some of the findings based on the mortality risk literature.  As a proxy for 
risk attitudes, several studies have used information about workers’ behavior outside of 
the workplace, such as smoking status and seatbelt use, to identify the effect of risk 
preferences on wage-risk tradeoffs.  Hersch and Viscusi (1990), Hersch and Pickton 
(1995), and Viscusi and Hersch (2001) all found that smokers have lower injury risk 
premiums than do non-smokers.  Hersch and Viscusi as well as Hersch and Pickton also  
 
39
found that individuals who do not wear seatbelts have lower injury risk premiums than do 
individuals who regularly wear seatbelts. 
  The study by Hersch (1998) is of particular interest because it used gender-
specific risk measures.  Many previous studies had focused on male samples only 
because estimates using industry-based measures often failed to yield significant risk 
premiums for women.  Researchers hypothesized that women did not work in risky jobs 
that would pose health and safety risks.  The estimates by Hersch indicate that the 
nonfatal injury risk for women is over two-thirds the size of that for men and that the 
wage-injury risk tradeoff rates are similar for men and women. 
The evidence outside of the United States, while based on a smaller set of studies, 
also indicates significant injury risk premiums.  For example, the Cousineau et al. (1992) 
result falls within the U.S. range of about $20,000 – $70,000.  However, several other 
Canadian labor market studies provide some estimates that are lower, such as Martinello 
and Meng (1992) and Meng and Smith (1999).  The value of statistical injury estimates 
for India are much smaller, likely reflecting the effect of per capita income on wage-risk 
tradeoffs.  The low values of statistical injury are somewhat surprising given that these 
same studies generated fairly large values of statistical life. 
 
 
6. The effects of income on the value of a statistical life 
  The review of the VSLs above shows that developing countries tend to have 
lower values of statistical life than do developed countries.  A variety of factors could 
account for such an outcome, such as cultural influences on risk preferences and  
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variations in labor market institutions.  The dominant cause, however, is most likely that 
developing countries are poorer, and safety is a normal good, as shown in Viscusi 
(1978a).  The value of a statistical life should increase with per capita income.  To assess 
the relationship between the value of a statistical life and income, we first review several 
meta-analyses of the wage-risk literature.  Second, we provide our estimates of the 
income elasticity of the value of a statistical life based on the meta-analysis approaches 
employed in four previous studies with a data set we constructed from our review of the 
papers presented in Tables 2 and 4.  Third, we report income elasticities for a number of 
specifications in our preferred meta-analytic approach.   
  Since wage-risk studies employ a measure of income (usually a function of hourly 
or weekly labor earnings) as the dependent variable, an individual study cannot estimate 
the effect of income on the premium for bearing mortality risk.  The injury risk study of 
Viscusi and Evans (1990) used experimental data coupled with market evidence to 
estimate income elasticities of injury risk valuations from 0.6 to 1.0.  A meta-analysis of 
existing VSL studies can facilitate the calculation of the income elasticity for the value of 
a statistical life.  The type of meta-analysis used in the VSL literature attempts to evaluate 
the VSL (the constructed dependent variable) as a function of a number of studies’ 
characteristics (such as mean income of the sample population, mean mortality risk, and 
econometric specification).    
  The published meta-analyses on the value of a statistical life literature vary in 
terms of their sample construction, explanatory variables, and regression technique.  Liu, 
Hammitt, and Liu (1997) sampled 17 wage-risk studies surveyed in Viscusi (1993) and 
regressed VSL on income and mean risk.   The Liu et al. sample comprised primarily  
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U.S. wage-risk studies.  They reported a statistically insignificant income elasticity of 
0.53.  Miller (2000) developed an international sample including more than 60 wage-risk, 
product-risk, and contingent valuation studies.  Miller employed a relatively small set of 
explanatory variables, including income.  For five models, Miller estimated statistically 
significant income elasticities ranging from 0.85 to 0.96.  Bowland and Beghin (2001) 
conducted a meta-analysis with a set of 33 wage-risk and contingent valuation studies 
surveyed in Viscusi (1993) and Desvousges et al. (1995).  They matched the data on 
these studies with a variety of country-specific data on demographics, human capital, etc.  
Bowland and Beghin employed robust regression with Huber weights to address concerns 
about the non-normality in the residuals of their data.  Bowland and Beghin reported 
statistically significant income elasticities of 1.7 and 2.3.  In contrast to the previous three 
papers, Mrozek and Taylor (2002) constructed a sample of about 200 observations 
reflecting multiple VSL estimates from 33 wage-risk studies (eight of which evaluated 
non-U.S. labor markets).  They employed the most extensive set of control variables, 
including those characterizing a study’s sample, risk measure, specification, and earnings.  
For two models, Mrozek and Taylor impute statistically significant estimates of 0.46 and 
0.49 for the income elasticity for the value of a statistical life. 
  To further explore the relationship between income and WTP, we have conducted 
a meta-analysis based on the U.S. and international VSLs reported in this paper.  Our 
sample includes the VSLs for 49 studies presented in Tables 2 and 4.
27  Each study yields 
one observation.  Refer to the appendix for a description of the explanatory variables and 
their summary statistics. 
                                                 
27 Studies for which we do not have an income measure were omitted.  
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We replicated the results from the four previous meta-analysis studies with our 
wage-risk study sample (see Table 6).  For the Liu et al. (1997) model, we replicated their 
econometric specification exactly.  Miller (2000) reported a number of specifications.  
Only model 3 of Miller’s meta-analysis employed per capita incomes converted to US 
dollars on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis.  Because we constructed all VSLs and 
annual incomes based on a PPP basis, we replicated his model 3.  Note that dummy 
variables for contingent valuation surveys and wage-risk studies are unnecessary since 
our data set comprises only wage-risk studies.  Bowland and Beghin (2001) reported 
results for linear, log-linear, and trans-log specifications.  While they presented very 
limited information about most of their control variables, we have attempted to replicate 
their set of controls.  We do not have information on the average age of the sample used 
in the VSL studies, and we have omitted this variable from our specification.   We have 
proxied for percent of sample in union-affiliated jobs by accounting for whether the VSL 
study includes union membership as a control and whether the VSL is union-based.  Our 
studies do not provide average educational attainment, so we have proxied these values 
with national annual average educational attainment for the over-25 population from 
Barro and Lee (1996).  We replicated the robust regressions with Huber weights.  Our 
analyses with log-linear and trans-log specifications, however, yielded insignificant 
coefficients on income.  We only present the results from the linear robust regression 
model with our data.  Mrozek and Taylor (2002) reported results from four specification 
models.  We have focused on their model 2 since model 1 yields virtually identical results 
and models 3 and 4 are U.S.-specific.  We have included all the control variables that  
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Mrozek and Taylor report, with the exception of a dummy variable for white collar-based 
VSLs.  Our sample does not include any white collar-based VSLs. 
  Three of the four specifications yield statistically significant coefficients on the 
relevant income variable.  We found a comparable point estimate with much narrower 
bounds than Liu et al. with their specification, perhaps reflecting our larger sample, as 
their sample is essentially a subset of our sample.  We found a smaller coefficient on the 
income variable than Miller with his specification, although a very comparable 
coefficient on the Society of Actuaries risk data dummy variable (equivalent to Miller’s 
variable label “risk beyond workplace” with our data).  For comparison with Bowland 
and Beghin’s choice of using “marginal willingness to pay” as their dependent variable 
(apparently equivalent to the VSL expressed in terms of hourly wage instead of annual 
labor income), we modified our dependent variable accordingly.  Imputing the income 
elasticity with the linear income coefficient in this model requires the sample means of 
VSL ($3,350 per hour worked, assuming 2000 hours worked per year and $6.7 million 
VSL) and income ($26,006).  With 23 explanatory variables and only 41 observations, 
the Mrozek and Taylor specification yields very few precise coefficient estimates.   
While the reported income elasticities from these four studies vary by a factor of 
3, the imputed elasticity point estimates with our data set cover a much smaller range (see 
Table 7).  With these studies’ specifications, we found income elasticities from about 0.5 
to 0.6.  The 95 percent confidence interval upper bounds fall below 1.0 for two of the 
three statistically significant income elasticities estimated by the specifications outlined 
in these four studies.  The apparently large variation in income elasticities in this  
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literature apparently reflects authors’ choices of studies for inclusion more so than 
choices over control variables, regression techniques, etc. 
  To augment the replications of previously published meta-analysis specifications, 
we evaluated a large number of specifications.  Based on the existing literature, we 
focused on two regression techniques, ordinary least squares and robust regression with 
Huber weights.  We have varied the control variables from as few as 3 to as many as 18, 
recognizing that coefficient estimates’ precision will decline with the length of the right-
hand side of the regression equations given our sample size.  We chose to include 
explanatory variables of the following types: income and mean risk (common to all 
specifications), type of risk measure, and specification variables. 
The estimated coefficient on the income variable is rather stable across both 
regression techniques and for a wide variation in the number of control variables (see 
Table 8).  For the OLS specifications, the income elasticity varies from 0.49 to 0.60.  The 
95 percent confidence intervals never range below 0.2 and never exceed 0.95.  For the 
robust regression specifications, the income elasticity varies from 0.46 to 0.48.  The 95 
percent confidence intervals never fall below 0.15 and never exceed 0.78.
28  The income 
coefficients in all specifications are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
  Based on the approximately 50 wage-risk studies from 10 countries, we can 
conclude from these results that the income elasticity for the value of a statistical life is 
                                                 
28 We also estimated a regression with the Mrozek and Taylor set of control variables, with an important 
exception of replacing the hourly earnings variable with the natural logarithm of annual income.  With an 
OLS specification, we estimated an income elasticity of 0.76 with a 95 percent confidence interval of 0.20 
– 1.32 (n=41).  In the robust regression with Huber weights specification, we estimated again a point 
estimate for the income elasticity of 0.76, but with a much tighter 95 percent confidence interval of 0.73 – 
0.79 (n=38).  The income variable was statistically significant at the 5 percent level in the OLS regression 
and significant at the 1 percent level in the robust regression.  The iterative weighting process in robust 
regression with this much larger set of control variables effectively eliminated several low-VSL studies 
relative to specification 6 in Table 8, which may have resulted in the larger elasticity.  
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less than 1.0.  Across a number of specifications with our data, our point estimates of the 
income elasticity range between about 0.5 and 0.6.  Note that in none of our 
specifications did the income elasticity’s 95 percent confidence interval upper bound 
exceed 1.0. 
  Current practice by regulatory agencies is effectively in line with these findings.  
The U.S. EPA (1999) accounted for income growth into the 22nd century in monetizing 
the long-term mortality risk reduction benefits from stratospheric ozone protection.
29  In a 
regulatory context, the U.S. EPA (2000b) also accounted for income growth over a thirty-
year period in monetizing the mortality risk reduction benefits from reduced particulate 
matter pollution associated with the diesel sulfur standard for heavy-duty trucks.  In both 
these cases, the U.S. EPA employed an income elasticity of 0.4 and conducted sensitivity 
analyses with a low-end elasticity of 0.1 and a high-end elasticity of 1.0.  If our results of 
the income elasticity apply over time, the point estimate chosen by the EPA is reasonable, 
although more narrow bounds may be appropriate for the sensitivity analysis. 
  The meta-analysis regressions can also serve to characterize some of the 
uncertainty in value of a statistical life estimates.  We constructed the mean predicted 
VSL values presented in the last two rows of Table 8 by first using the estimated 
coefficients from the meta-analysis regressions to predict the natural logarithm of VSL 
for each study.  Then we converted each predicted log(VSL) to a predicted VSL.  We 
averaged these over all studies that were included in each regression model’s sample to 
produce the average values reported in the table.  We constructed the average 95 percent 
confidence intervals by first estimating the prediction error for each study from the meta-
analysis regressions.  We then used this prediction error to construct study-specific 95 
                                                 
29 The Science Advisory Board (2000) has supported EPA’s adjustment of the VSL for income growth.  
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percent confidence intervals.  The values for the lower and upper bounds of these 
confidence intervals were then averaged over all the studies in the regression sample.  
The U.S. specific results are based on regression samples that include non-U.S. studies; 
only the averaging is U.S.-specific.
30 
  The mean predicted VSLs from the meta-analysis regression models for the whole 
sample vary from $5.0 to $6.2 million, and from $5.5 to $7.6 million for the U.S. sample.  
An assessment of median predicted VSLs produced very similar results.  For most 
regression models, the 95 percent confidence interval upper bound is double or more than 
the 95 percent confidence interval lower bound.  Note that the small number of degrees of 
freedom in specifications 3 and 6 yielded very large bounds around the measure of 
central tendency.  While this analysis can characterize some of the uncertainty around the 
value of a statistical life, several caveats are in order.  First, the description of uncertainty 
presumes that the proper VSL meta-analysis model has been specified.  Otherwise, the 
bounds around the predicted means are not valid.  Second, this assessment of uncertainty 
regards the value of a statistical life constructed from a sample of wage-risk studies of 
prime-aged workers.  Policy applications of these VSLs in benefits transfer should 
consider appropriate modifications to the VSL point estimate and the distribution around 
it. 
 
                                                 
30 We also calculated the median predicted VSL values for the full and U.S. samples.  For the full sample, 
the median predicted VSL never exceeded the mean predicted VSL in any of the six regression models by 
more than 14 percent, and the mean predicted VSL never exceeded the median predicted VSL by more than 
15 percent.  For the U.S. sample, the median predicted VSL exceeded the mean predicted VSL in all six 
regressions, but never by more than 7 percent.  
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7. The effects of union affiliation on the value of a statistical life 
  Since the U.S. and international evidence from labor markets and other product 
markets demonstrate a significant wage-risk tradeoff, numerous researchers have 
explored several factors that may influence the compensating differential for risk.  The 
relationship between union affiliation and the wage-risk tradeoff has received substantial 
attention in the literature.   Most studies of the U.S. labor market find that union 
affiliation is positively correlated with a greater wage-risk tradeoff while the international 
evidence is much more mixed. 
  Workers in union jobs may enjoy an additional premium for bearing risk greater 
than those in nonunion jobs for several reasons.  First, if firms face an upward sloping 
labor supply curve, then the absence of collective bargaining may result in inefficiently 
low level of workplace safety.  Viscusi (1980) shows that if the marginal worker’s 
valuation of workplace safety differs from the average worker’s valuation, then the firm 
would provide a suboptimal level of safety.  If the marginal worker is willing to accept 
less of a decrease in wage for an incremental improvement in safety than the average 
worker, then workplace safety would be too low.  If the marginal worker tends to be 
younger and less experienced while the average worker tends to be older and wealthier, 
then the average worker with greater wealth and family obligations may have a greater 
preference for workplace safety than the marginal worker.  In light of this inefficiently 
low provision of safety, unions may bargain over workplace safety in addition to wages 
and other benefits on behalf of the inframarginal workers who may place greater value on 
risk reduction than the marginal worker.  
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  A second, and not entirely unrelated phenomenon, is that workplace safety may 
be a quasi-public good and suffer the common under-provision associated with such 
goods due to free-riding (Dillingham and Smith 1984).  If a firm provides some level of 
workplace safety (e.g., a fire extinguishing system), then one worker’s consumption of 
this safety does not preclude another worker from enjoying the same consumption.  Since 
safety is quasi-public, a worker lacks the incentive to truthfully reveal his or her 
preference for safety, especially since an increase in safety would likely correspond to a 
decline in the wage (or some other benefit).  Collective action can overcome such free-
riding.  In this case, collective bargaining by a union with a firm could reflect all 
workers’ true preferences for safety, and result in higher aggregate demand for safety by 
workers than what would be expected in a non-union setting.  This higher demand would 
translate into greater compensating differentials for job-related injury and fatality risk. 
  Third, if some workers lack adequate information about the safety at their 
workplace, then they may underestimate the actual risks they face.  Workers 
underestimating their on-the-job risk would demand lower wages than if they held correct 
perceptions of risk.  Unions potentially could provide workers with more accurate 
information about their on-the-job risks (Viscusi 1979, Olson 1981).  Unions can take 
advantage of economies of scale in providing information not available to unorganized 
non-union workers (Dillingham and Smith 1984).  Unions may also negotiate for 
mechanisms that increase worker exposure to safety information.  For example, Olson 
noted that a 1976 BLS survey showed that 36 percent of all workers covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement worked in establishments that sponsored joint firm-
worker safety committees.  
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  To evaluate the extent to which these factors influence compensating differentials 
for on-the-job risk, researchers have taken two estimation approaches (see Table 9).   
First, some have split their samples into union and non-union subsamples and estimated 
the wage regressions separately for each subsample.  Second, others have included an 
interaction term, risk variable x union dummy variable, in the wage regression model.  In 
our review of papers evaluating union effects, only Olson (1981) assessed the union-risk 
premium with both the separate sample regression approach and the risk-union 
interaction approach.  Both approaches yield substantial differences in compensating 
differentials for union and non-union members.   
  Regardless of estimation strategy, most assessments of the U.S. labor market 
found higher risk premiums for union workers than for non-union workers (see Table 9a).  
Of the ten U.S. labor market value of life studies we reviewed that evaluated the role of 
unions in risk premiums, nine found union workers enjoyed greater compensating 
differentials for bearing risk than nonunion workers.  In contrast to accepted theory, 
several of these papers found that non-union workers had insignificant or statistically 
significant negative compensating differentials for risk.
31 
Table 9b summarizes the rather mixed effects of unionization on premiums for 
nonfatal risks in the U.S. labor market.  In the studies that controlled for fatal risks, the 
compensating differential for injury risk for nonunion workers often exceeded the 
differential for union workers, even in the same studies where the union fatality risk 
premium was greater (e.g., Olson 1981, Dorsey 1983, Dorsey and Walzer 1984).  Olson 
                                                 
31 For example, Dorsey (1983) estimated a statistically significant negative coefficient on the fatality risk 
variable and a statistically significant positive coefficient on the union x risk interaction variable.  This 
combination (with the union x risk coefficient greater in magnitude than the fatality risk coefficient) results 
in a positive compensating differential for union workers and a negative differential for non-union workers.    
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found that union workers enjoyed a greater positive premium than nonunion workers for 
injury incidence but a negative premium for injury duration (number of lost workdays), in 
contrast to nonunion workers’ positive premium.   
In regressions that did not include a variable for fatality risk in the estimation 
model, the findings reflected the results for fatality risk discussed above.  Hamermesh 
and Wolfe (1990) found that the extra compensating differential for union workers 
reflected injury incidence, while injury duration was insignificant, similar to Olson.   
While Freeman and Medoff (1981) could not discern between the statistically significant 
injury risk premiums for union and non-union workers, Smith (1983), Biddle and Zarkin 
(1988), Fairris (1992), and Hersch and Pickton (1995) all found greater compensating 
differentials for nonfatal risks for union than for nonunion workers. 
  While the majority of the U.S. research illustrates greater risk premiums for union 
workers, the research on labor markets in other countries often reveals a more ambiguous 
union impact on risk premiums.  Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982) conducted the first 
analysis of compensating differentials for risk in the U.K. labor market, and found that 
union affiliation had an insignificant impact on the risk premium.  In an attempt to 
replicate this initial study, Arabsheibani and Marin (2000) also could not find any 
evidence supporting a union-risk premium based on membership or union strength.  In 
contrast, Siebert and Wei (1994) found higher union risk premiums when accounting for 
potential endogeneity of risk.  Subsequent research by Sandy and Elliott (1996) countered 
this finding with analysis indicating larger compensating differentials for risk for 
nonunion members.  These four researchers collaborated in a follow-up study, Sandy et  
 
51
al. (2001), which concluded with a qualified claim that nonunion workers enjoy greater 
risk premiums. 
  For the Canadian labor market, several analyses have found little support for a 
positive impact of union affiliation on compensating differentials for risk.  In a series of 
analyses with union x fatality risk interaction terms, Meng (1989, 1991), and Martinello 
and Meng (1992) found no significant effect for accident risk, while Meng and Smith 
(1990) found a negative statistically significant coefficient that when combined with the 
fatality risk coefficient would translate into no compensating differential for union 
members (in contrast to the positive risk premium for non-union members).  In contrast, 
Cousineau et al. (1992) found for a large Quebec sample that union members received 
larger premiums for both fatality risk and injury incidence, but a smaller premium for 
injury duration, than nonunion members.  Further, Lanoie et al. (1995) found significant 
positive compensating differentials for perceived risk for the union sub-sample from their 
survey of Montreal work establishments. 
Finally, the few analyses of developing country labor markets have also found 
mixed effects of union affiliation on a worker’s risk premium.  In his analysis of the 
Indian labor market, Shanmugam (1996-7) included a union x fatality risk interaction 
term, and found that union members alone enjoy a compensating differential for risk.  For 
the South Korean labor market, Kim and Fishback (1999) could not statistically discern 




8. The effects of age on the value of a statistical life 
  Evaluating wage-risk tradeoffs in labor markets to estimate the value of a 
statistical life raises the important question of whether life expectancy affects the value of 
a statistical life.  Age affects the duration of life at risk and also may be correlated with 
other variables that affect one’s willingness to bear risk, which are not age effects per se 
but rather reflect changing preferences over the life cycle.  Numerous analyses have 
shown that the magnitude of the VSL is a decreasing function of age, whereas the value 
of any particular year of life may increase with age (Rosen 1988).
32  Wholly apart from 
life expectancy effects, accounting for the effect of age in the utility function in terms of 
deteriorating health and quality of life would have generated similar results.
33   
  Using this framework, Rosen undertook several simulations based on his previous 
empirical work (Thaler and Rosen 1975).  He estimated that the value of a statistical life-
year, which is equal to the expected consumer surplus for another year, for the average-
aged individual in the sample ranges from about $31,000 to $130,000, based on discount 
rates ranging from 0 to 12 percent.  Using data on life expectancy by age, Rosen 
calculated the value of a statistical life for comparable individuals who varied from 36 
years to 48 years of age.  The 48-year old’s VSL is 10 percent less than the 36-year old’s 
VSL. 
  Several researchers have undertaken direct empirical estimates of the effect of age 
on the return to risk in hedonic labor market analysis.  A simple approach to estimating 
                                                 
32 Rosen’s research yields results similar to the Jones-Lee (1976), Jones-Lee et al. (1985), and Shepard and 
Zeckhauser (1982, 1984) finding that the value of a statistical life takes an inverted-U shape with respect to 
age.  Also refer to Garber and Phelps (1997) for an assessment of quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) in 
the cost-effectiveness literature.  Jenkins et al. (2001) provide some evidence that the value of a statistical 
life is increasing over childhood through the pre-retirement years. 
33 Modifying utility functions in this way would be analogous to constructing QALY measures, common to 
valuations based on health status in the health economics literature.  The QALYs are usually based on 
stated preference methods (see Cutler and Richardson 1997).  
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the effect requires interacting the mortality risk and age variables in the regression model.  
While some researchers did not identify significant coefficients to this interaction (Meng 
and Smith 1990 and Shanmugam 1996/7, 2001), several others found statistically 
significant and negative estimates broadly consistent with the theory (see Table 10).   
Research by Thaler and Rosen (1975), Viscusi (1979), Arnould and Nichols (1983), and 
Moore and Viscusi (1988b) yielded the negative relationship between age and the return 
to risk.  Within the context of a local housing market, Portney (1981) found that the value 
of a statistical life based on trading off mortality risk associated with local air pollution 
exposure and housing prices declines significantly with age: an individual under the age 
of 45 has a VSL 20 times greater than an individual over the age of 65.   
Dillingham, Miller, and Levy (1996) employed a modified approach by focusing 
on the willingness to pay to avoid a fully impaired worklife, where death is the extreme 
case of impairment.  The authors construct a risk variable that reflects injury frequency, 
severity, and probability of fatality.  They assume that a worklife shortened by a fatal 
injury is equivalent to a worklife shortened by a permanently disabling injury.  Their 
“value of remaining worklife” ranges from $3.1 - $4.7 million for the whole sample, 
although it decreases with age.  For example, they estimate that a 50-year old values 
remaining worklife at half the value held by a 30-year old. 
Some researchers have proposed a value per discounted expected life-year 
approach (Moore and Viscusi 1988b).  In lieu of a value of a statistical life, one could 
adjust the VSL measure for the life expectancy of individuals by essentially annuitizing 
the estimated VSL.  Based on actuarial tables, one could estimate the life expectancy for 
the average-aged individual in a study and then develop estimates of the life-year value  
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(either by assuming a discount rate, or as in several studies, estimating a discount rate 
based on revealed preference procedures – see below).  Then this life-year could be 
applied to other situations where life expectancy would differ from the average in the 
study in question.  This approach provides an “age-adjusted” or “life expectancy-
adjusted” VSL alternative to the standard VSL.  While the life-year approach does 
address the concern that values of a statistical life should vary with life expectancy, they 
assume that the marginal value of another year is constant across the age spectrum and 
across time for a given individual.
34 
  Accounting for the effects of age on the value of a statistical life through a life-
year approach requires the discounting of future consumer surplus (since, on the margin, 
the compensating differential should equal the present discounted value of a worker’s 
expected consumer surplus).  A variety of papers have imputed workers’ or consumers’ 
implicit rates of discount (Moore and Viscusi 1988b, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, Viscusi and 
Moore 1989, Dreyfus and Viscusi 1995).  While the Moore and Viscusi (1988b) and 
Dreyfus and Viscusi papers estimate implicit discount rates and marginal discounted life-
years based on reduced form models, the other three papers develop structural models to 
estimate discount rates.  Also note that all of these models are based on data from labor 
markets, except for the Dreyfus and Viscusi’s automobile hedonic study.  Rational 
individuals can implicitly discount their health capital at a different rate than what they 
face in markets (e.g., real interest rate for a home mortgage) since health status is a non-
traded commodity (one cannot “save” good health at age 25 for consumption at age 75).  
                                                 
34 Based on Rosen’s life cycle model, one would expect that the marginal value of another year is greater 
for an elderly person than for a middle-aged person but that the value of all future years declines with age 
for a given individual.  Accounting for health status may counter the effect of increasing marginal values 
for a one-year life extension for an elderly person.  If health status is decreasing in age, then it may be 
ambiguous whether the marginal value of another year increases with age.  
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Despite this possibility, these models estimate discount rates that are broadly consistent 
with the real rates of interest typical workers and consumers face (see Table 11).   
 
9. The application of the value of a statistical life to public policy decisions 
  At least in the countries with a high level of development, governments 
recommend or require economic analyses of proposed regulations and public policies.
35  
Regulatory agencies in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, have been 
most prominent in their use of VSL estimates to value the benefits of proposed 
environmental, health, and safety rules.  In some cases, regulatory agencies have 
modified the VSL to account for distinctive characteristics of the risk and the affected 
population.  In the United States, some environmental laws preclude the promulgation of 
regulations based on benefit-cost analysis.  In these cases, analysts have turned to risk-
risk analysis – based in part on an application of the value of a statistical life – to provide 
some guidance about whether a proposed policy is in fact risk reducing. 
9.1 The use of VSLs in government decision-making around the world   
9.1.1 United States.  Over the past twenty years in the United States, executive orders by 
Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton have mandated economic impact analyses of all 
significant Federal regulations (E.O. 12044, E.O. 12291 and E.O. 12866).  Beginning 
with the Reagan Administration, these executive orders vested with the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) the responsibility for overseeing and coordinating the 
review of regulatory impact analyses.  OMB has published guidelines for all Federal 
agencies, such as its report with respect to the use of “best practices” in these analyses 
                                                 
35 For example, refer to the guidance to improve regulatory decision-making provided by the OECD (1995) 
to its member countries.  
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(U.S. OMB 1996).  The guidance recommends the use of a value of a statistical life to 
monetize the benefits associated with rules that change the population’s mortality risk.  
While OMB does not recommend a specific VSL or set of VSLs, it does provide a 
discussion of the issues agencies should consider when choosing a VSL based on the 
current state of knowledge. 
Until the 1980s the dominant policy approach to valuing the benefits of reduced 
risks of death was based on various human capital measures, such as the present value of 
lost earnings and medical expenses.  These values are lower than the VSL amounts.  
Typical of this approach was the 1982 analysis by OSHA of its proposed hazard 
communication regulation.  OSHA valued lives saved based on the cost of death, which 
was the human capital value, because in its view life was too sacred to value.  After OMB 
rejected the regulation, claiming that the costs exceeded the benefits, OSHA appealed the 
decision to then Vice-President Bush.  W. Kip Viscusi was asked to settle the economic 
dispute between the two agencies.  By valuing life properly using a VSL, the estimated 
benefits exceeded the costs.  The regulation was approved the day after his analysis 
reached the Reagan White House.
36  Thus, the historical impetus for the adoption of the 
VSL methodology was that these values boosted assessed benefits by roughly an order of 
magnitude, improving the attractiveness of agencies’ regulatory efforts. 
The flexibility provided to U.S. agencies in choosing a VSL appropriate to the 
population affected by their specific rules has resulted in significant variations in the 
selected VSL both across agencies and through time (see Table 12 and Adler and Posner 
2000).  In addition, some regulatory impact analyses have included a range of benefits 
reflecting different assumptions about the VSL, often reflecting the age profile of the 
                                                 
36 For a review of the substance of this analysis, see Viscusi (1992a).  
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affected population by using a VSL adjusted by the number of life-years saved (e.g., the 
FDA rule restricting tobacco sales to children, 61 FR 44396, and the EPA rule regulating 
the sulfur content of gasoline, 65 FR 6698).  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), responsible for more costly Federal rule-makings than any other U.S. agency, has 
developed economic guidelines for its regulatory impact analyses (U.S. EPA 2000a).   
The EPA guidelines recommend a VSL of $6.2 million (2000US$), reflecting the 
arithmetic mean of 26 studies reviewed in Viscusi (1992a).  
In contrast, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (1998) recommends a value 
of a statistical life of $3 million in its 2002 economic analyses of regulations.
37  This 
comparatively low value of life may reflect in part an anchoring effect.  The U.S. 
Department of Transportation was a leader in valuing mortality risk reductions, but began 
doing so in an era in which the present value of lost earnings was the dominant approach.  
The agency has slowly increased the value attached to reduced risks of death, but it has 
continued to lag behind the estimates in the literature.
38 
9.1.2 United Kingdom.  In the United Kingdom, the Cabinet Office has likewise provided 
guidance for economic analyses for the government’s regulatory and policy-making 
agencies (U.K. Cabinet Office 2000, H.M. Treasury 1997).  While the guidance does not 
specify the value of a statistical life to be used by agencies, it does recommend careful 
consideration of the challenges in applying values estimated in the economic literature to 
potentially different risk and population contexts of the policy or regulation. 
                                                 
37 Refer to Table E-1 at Internet: http://www.api.faa.gov/economic/EXECSUMM.PDF  a n d  
http://www.api.faa.gov/economic/742SECT2.PDF.  
38 The low VSL used by the agency also reflects a political dimension as well.  In the early 1990s when 
Viscusi prepared the report that was subsequently published as Viscusi (1993) for the Federal Aviation 
Administration, that branch of the agency favored a higher value of life than was later mandated for use 
throughout the department.  
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The U.K. Department of the Environment, Transport, and Regions (DETR; 
formerly Department of Transport) has employed a willingness-to-pay based value of 
preventing a fatality since 1988 in its regulatory and policy analyses (Chilton et al. 1999).  
The value of preventing a fatality selected in 1988, $1.2 million (£500,000 in 1987 
prices), is still used by the Department.  This value reflects contingent valuation-based 
estimates of individuals’ willingness-to-pay for risk reduction.  The U.K. Health and 
Safety Executive uses the DETR value of preventing a fatality as a starting point for its 
regulatory impact analyses.  The HSE has employed a value of preventing a fatality 
double the DETR value for cancer-related fatalities, concluding that individuals’ dread of 
the disease significantly outweighs the affects of latency on willingness-to-pay (Andrews 
and McCrea 1999).
39 
Whereas U.S. agencies rely on market-based VSL estimates, in the U.K. the 
emphasis is on contingent valuation estimates.  This difference in approach no doubt 
stems in part from the different character of the empirical evidence in the two countries.  
There have been dozens of studies of U.S. wage-risk tradeoffs, most of which have been 
in a reasonable range.  There have been far fewer such analyses for the U.K., and the 
resulting empirical estimates have been much more unstable. 
 
9.1.3 Canada.  In Canada, the Privy Council Office published guidelines for benefit-cost 
analysis in 1995.  While these guidelines do not specify one or a set of values of a 
statistical life, they do note the need for serious consideration of the value of life, 
                                                 
39 Note that the Science Advisory Board to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency considered the 
effects of latency and dread within the context of cancer-related mortality.  The SAB (2000) concluded that 
the literature does not currently support a modification of the value of a statistical life to reflect dread.  In 
contrast, the SAB did recommend that economic analyses account for latency by discounting future 
mortality to the present time consistent with the approach to other categories of benefits and costs.    
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determinants of the appropriate VSL, and possible approaches to presenting useful 
information for policymakers and the public.  The value of a statistical life is left to the 
discretion of agencies promulgating regulations, again much like the U.S. and U.K. 
approaches.   
Transport Canada reviewed the economic analyses for 145 transportation-related 
projects over 1982 – 1993 (Blanchard 1996).  The VSL used in these analyses ranged 
from $400,000 to $3.2 million.  A recent analysis of a Canadian proposed rule on tobacco 
products information used a range of the value of a statistical life of $1.7 - $5.7 million,
40 
with higher values for individuals under age 65 (Hara Associates 2000).  A comparable 
range and age-based VSL differential was employed in an evaluation of a Canadian 
proposal for cleaner vehicles in fuels as well (Lang et al. 1995). 
9.1.4 Multinational organizations.  The value of a statistical life has also received 
attention in multinational contexts.  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), established by the United Nations Environment Programme and the World 
Health Organization in 1988 to provide technical support to participants in global climate 
change negotiations, discussed issues regarding the value of a statistical life in its 1995 
and 2001 assessments of the economic and social dimensions of climate change (IPCC 
1996, 2001).  Moreover, the European Commission (EC) began in 2000 a process to 
prepare guidance for benefits analysis to improve benefit-cost analysis procedures within 
the EC.  The EC effort has focused a substantial amount of time and resources on the 
value of a statistical life question (EC 2000).   
                                                 
40 The conversion to U.S. dollars for the Hara Associates analysis was based on the annual market 
exchange rate reported by the Federal Reserve (refer to Internet: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g5a/current/) because the Penn World Table does not provide 
conversions for the most recent years.  
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9.2 Issues Pertaining to Benefits Transfers  
  The vast majority of the studies reviewed in this paper cover prime-aged workers 
who have chosen to bear the risk of accidental, immediate death.  Many of the studies 
based their quantitative analyses on samples from the 1970s and 1980s.  With the 
exception of occupational safety policies, most government regulations affect mortality 
risks with different qualitative characteristics or affect populations with characteristics 
that differ from those of the samples in these studies.  The demographic characteristics of 
specific groups and the population at large likely differ today (and will differ in the 
future) from what they were 20 to 30 years ago.  The risk-money tradeoffs of those 
affected by government policy may differ from those values estimated in hedonic market 
studies. 
For example, many environmental regulations address carcinogen exposure.   
Reduced cancer-related mortality presents several issues that merit consideration when 
employing a VSL.  First, individuals may be willing to pay more to avoid dying of cancer 
than to avoid an instantaneous accidental death.  Revesz (1999) hypothesizes that this 
“dread” effect of cancer mortality should result in an upward revision to the VSL.  This 
reasoning apparently underlies the higher VSL used by the UK Health and Safety 
Executive for cancer-related fatalities.  The EPA’s Science Advisory Board (2000) 
recommended against any “dread”-related modification to the value of a statistical life on 
the grounds that the current literature did not support any such change.
 41  In particular, 
contingent valuation estimates of cancer mortality risks have produced values similar to 
                                                 
41 While Revesz suggests other adjustments to the value of a statistical life based on the qualitative 
characteristics of the risk, such as involuntariness of the risk, the Science Advisory Board (2000) noted that 
the existing literature does not justify adjustments for these effects.  
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those observed for accidental deaths.
42  The market-based evidence for cancer risks 
discussed above is similar to the results for accident risks. 
  Cancer-related mortality also differs significantly from occupational mortality in 
terms of the timing of the death.  The long latency period for cancer (and other chronic 
health conditions affected by government regulations) should be discounted in the 
benefits analysis (Revesz 1999, Science Advisory Board 2000).  Given the rough 
similarity of the implicit rates of discount discussed in Section 8 to current market 
interest rates, a benefit-cost analysis could employ one common discount rate for all 
categories of benefits and costs.  
  Several researchers have questioned the discounting of benefits of reducing future 
risks to life when evaluating public policies.  Heinzerling (1998, 1999, 2000) has 
criticized the discounting of statistical lives on moral grounds.  She claims that a 
statistical life cannot be discerned from an actual life, which society would not attempt to 
price.  This concern pertains to both current and future risk reductions and is not a 
discounting argument per se.  While Heinzerling expresses significant concerns with the 
concept of statistical lives and in their discounting, individuals make private risk-income, 
risk-time, and risk-risk tradeoffs every day, as evidenced by the literature surveyed in this 
paper, as well as by simple casual observation.
43  Further, as the studies presented in 
Table 11 illustrate, individuals value risks in the future less than they value 
commensurate risks they face today.  Both Revesz and Heinzerling raise concerns about 
                                                 
42 See Magat, Viscusi, and Huber (1996). 
43 This discussion implicitly acknowledges an important aspect of most occupational, safety, and 
environmental health risks: these risks are relatively small.  In cases of certain, or near-certain death, the 
empirical economic evidence and this argument are not relevant (see our discussion in Section 1).   
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discounting statistical lives in future generations (also see Arrow et al. 1996 for a survey 
of intergenerational discounting).   
  Failure to discount creates potentially fundamental paradoxes (see Keeler and 
Cretin 1983).  Suppose that the cost structure for reducing risks to life is unchanged over 
time.  Then it is always desirable to defer any life saving policy and invest the money that 
would have been spent on risk reduction.  Indeed, continual postponement of a life saving 
effort is always desirable if future benefits are never discounted but the money spent on 
these policies continues to grow at the rate of interest. 
  Similarly, suppose that future life saving benefits are not discounted.  If, however, 
one converts the cost allocations to a terminal value rather than discounting the benefits 
back to a present value, the effect will be identical in terms of whether the policy passes a 
benefit-cost test.  What the discounting critics generally fail to grasp is that what is being 
discounted are not lives but rather society’s willingness to pay for these future risks to 
life. 
  The differences in the age of the population in labor market studies and of the 
population affected by a regulation should also affect the value of a statistical life.  While 
fewer studies have focused on the effects of age on the return to risk, those that have tend 
to find that the value of a statistical life declines with age, consistent with the theoretical 
work.  Since these labor hedonic studies include samples where age usually ranges no 
higher than about 60 years, it may be difficult to extrapolate these results for older 
populations.  This is a significant issue in benefits transfer, since many environment and 
public health policies (as opposed to worker safety programs) deliver benefits to the 
elderly.  For example, recent air quality regulations promulgated by the U.S.  
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Environmental Protection Agency disproportionately benefit older individuals as 
illustrated by the average increase in life expectancy of less than 15 years (U.S. EPA 
1999, Science Advisory Board 1999a).  In response to this, the EPA’s Science Advisory 
Board (SAB) has questioned the appropriateness of EPA’s choice of a VSL for this 
population.  The SAB notes that it “question[s] the application of a WTP estimate for 
prime-aged individuals to a population of older individuals and people who are in poor 
health” (p. 6).  The SAB (1999b) has recommended that the EPA revise its VSL in light 
of this concern. 
  Several agencies already employ age-adjusted VSLs.  As noted above, the 
economic analysis of a Canadian tobacco regulation employed a smaller VSL for 
individuals older than 65.  The U.S. Food and Drug Administration regularly employs the 
value of statistical life-years, instead of VSLs, as a way to monetize the health benefits of 
their proposed rules.  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has reluctantly 
conducted benefit-cost analyses with the value of statistical life-years approach.  The 
clear findings in the theory and existing empirical evidence support such age adjustments.  
Future empirical research should further refine age-specific estimates of the value of a 
statistical life for use in regulatory analyses.  
9.3 The role of risk-risk analysis 
While the value of a statistical life can be used to monetize the benefits for risk 
policy evaluation, most laws do not require that agencies undertake such balancing and 
some laws in the United States actually preclude the consideration of benefit-cost 
analysis in setting standards.  For example, the courts have interpreted the Clean Air Act 
such that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency cannot base ambient air quality  
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standards on benefit-cost analysis or an assessment of the costs.
44  Even if a benefit-cost 
test cannot be applied, policies that on balance harm individual health presumably should 
not be adopted.  Several forms of risk-risk analysis can account for these various risk 
effects of policies in an effort to ascertain whether risk regulations on balance are risk 
reducing.  While risk-risk analysis cannot determine if a policy improves societal welfare, 
it can identify the policies that clearly do not improve societal welfare because they result 
in a net increase in mortality risk. 
  Four types of risk-risk tradeoffs could influence the net effect of a policy or 
regulation on a population’s risk exposure.  First, a policy may reduce risks of one type 
while increasing risks of another type.  For example, the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration considered banning saccharin, the artificial sweetener, in response to an 
animal study finding that it may be a potential human carcinogen.  However, banning 
saccharin would likely increase the risks associated with obesity.  In this case, the U.S. 
Congress allowed the use of saccharin in foods subject to a warning label on products 
containing the sweetener (Viscusi 1994b). 
Second, policies to reduce risks may create incentives for individuals to undertake 
less individual effort to reduce their exposure to risks (moral hazard).  These behavioral 
responses will offset some of the risk reduction of the policy, and could potentially 
increase net risks.  For example, Peltzman (1975) described how drivers responded to 
mandated safety devices in automobiles by changing their driving behavior.  Drivers in 
                                                 
44 For example, the 1997 final rule for the national ambient air quality standard for ozone introduced the 
section on the regulatory impact analysis with the following: “As discussed in Unit IV of this preamble, the 
Clean Air Act and judicial decisions make clear that the economic and technological feasibility of attaining 
ambient standards are not to be considered in setting NAAQS, although such factors may be considered in 
the development of State plans to implement the standards.  Accordingly, although, as described below, a 
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) has been prepared, neither the RIA nor the associated contractor reports 
have been considered in issuing this final rule” (62 FR 38856).  
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“safer cars” drove more recklessly than before.  The empirical evidence showed that 
while the safety measures reduced fatalities among automobile occupants, these gains 
have been offset at least in part by increases in pedestrian deaths and nonfatal accidents.   
  Third, risk-reduction policies may result in regulatory expenditures that directly 
increase fatalities.  For example, policies to remove asbestos from buildings may increase 
asbestos exposure by workers and use of excavation equipment at Superfund hazardous 
waste sites may result in construction-related injuries and fatalities (Graham and Wiener 
1995).  Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1994) illustrate through an input-output analysis the 
total direct and indirect injury and fatality risks associated with expenditures by industry.  
Regulations that require a reallocation of resources to industries with higher risks, for 
example towards construction to build new wastewater treatment facilities or to install 
pollution control technologies would result in an offsetting increase in mortality risk. 
  Fourth, the costs of risk-reduction policies decrease income available to finance 
other health and safety expenditures.  Wildavsky (1980, 1988) noted that the costs of 
risk-reduction policies reduce national income, some of which would otherwise be used 
to promote health and safety.  This argument focuses on the correlation between income 
and health, evident in both international cross-sectional data and U.S. time-series data 
(Viscusi 1983, 1994b, Graham et al. 1992, Lutter and Morrall 1994; see Smith et al. 1994 
for a critique of the international evidence).
45  These analyses illustrate that wealthier 
countries have lower mortality rates associated with greater health and safety 
investments.  Graham et al. (1992) extended the previous analyses on the mortality-
income relationship by focusing on the effect of permanent income.  They conclude that:  
                                                 
45 This relationship is also revealed within a cross-section of the U.S. population.  Viscusi (1978b) found 
that work-related risk exposure decreases with worker wealth.    
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“If government regulation reduces the level (or the rate of growth) of permanent income, 
it is likely to cause smaller health investments and an eventual decline in health status 
compared to what would have occurred without the economic burdens of regulation” (p. 
336).
46 
  Keeney (1990, 1994, 1997) formalized Wildavsky’s proposition and found that 
some expensive regulations aimed at reducing mortality risks actually increase mortality 
risks by reducing national income.  Keeney’s model yields various estimates for the 
induced-expenditure associated with an additional fatality that depend on the distribution 
of the burden of the policy costs.  Based on the mortality-income relationships estimated 
by Kitawaga and Hauser (1973) and Frerichs et al. (1984), Keeney estimates that between 
$13.6 million and $15.2 million of expenditures would induce a fatality, assuming costs 
are borne proportional to income.
47, 48  This research inspired a legal opinion of an OSHA 
regulation in the early 1990s.
49  U.S. Federal Appeals Court Judge Steven F. Williams 
wrote that regulations that do not pass a risk-risk analysis would be counterproductive.  
The U.S. Office of Management and Budget then suggested to OSHA that it consider 
risk-risk analysis in conducting its regulatory impact analyses.   
  While the research on the income-mortality relationship influenced several policy 
discussions in the early 1990s in the United States, the results from these studies point 
                                                 
46 Portney and Stavins (1994) question whether the income losses from regulations would reduce the 
population’s health status.  They claim that the nonlinear relationship between income and health and the 
modest impact of most regulations on the economy would not likely have a significant effect on health 
status.  While individual regulations may involve small costs as a share of the economy, it is important to 
note that environmental regulations alone cost about 1 – 2 percent of U.S. economic output (U.S. OMB 
2001).   
47 We have updated the reported values in Keeney (1990) to 2000 U.S. dollars using the CPI-U deflator. 
48 The Keeney estimates are near the high end of 11 studies cited in Lutter and Morrall (1994) on the 
income gains necessary to avert one fatality.   They are very similar to Lutter and Morrall’s estimated range 
of $11.4 million to $15.2 million for the United States. 
49 Refer to UAW v. OSHA, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 89-1559.  
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towards a peculiar inconsistency.  For the studies with expenditure-induced fatalities on 
the order of $5 million per fatality, the expenditure associated with a loss of one life is on 
par or perhaps below what individuals are willing to pay to reduce the risk of one fatality 
in the population based on the labor market hedonic studies (Viscusi 1994b).  Moreover, 
the mortality-income studies also suffer several other potential problems.  Some of these 
do not appropriately account for the simultaneity in the data – higher incomes allow 
individuals to invest more in health, but poor health often draws down an individual’s 
income (Chapman and Hariharan 1994).
50  Some of these studies also may suffer from 
omitted variable bias resulting in misidentifying the relationship between income and 
health.   
  As an alternative to deriving the income-mortality relationship from aggregate 
data, Viscusi (1994a) illustrates how to generate an estimate for the expenditure-induced 
fatality rate based on the value of a statistical life and the marginal propensity to spend on 
health.  Viscusi shows that 
health on    spend    to propensity   marginal
life   l statistica   a   of   value
  lost    life   l statistica per    e expenditur   marginal = . 
This approach requires an estimate of the value of a statistical life and an estimate of the 
marginal propensity to spend on health.  The literature surveyed in previous sections 
provides estimates for the numerator.  For the marginal propensity to spend on health, 
Viscusi estimated this based on an analysis of 24 OECD countries over the 1960 – 1989 
period and a time-series analysis for the United States over the same period (Viscusi 
                                                 
50 A recent paper by Gerdtham and Johannesson (2002) attempts to address this problem by controlling for 
initial health status in regressions of mortality risk on income (with other relevant controls) for a study 
focusing on Sweden in the 1980s and 1990s.  They find that an income loss ranging from $7.5 – $10.8 
million would induce an expected fatality in Sweden.  The range reflects variation in the progressivity of 
the burden of the regulation.  
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1992b, 1994a, 1994b).  Over an array of specifications for both data sets, the marginal 
propensity to spend on health ranged from 0.08 to 0.12.  This implies that for every dollar 
increase in national income, an additional 8 to 12 cents are spent on health care.   
Assuming a marginal propensity to spend on health of 0.1 and a VSL of about $6 million, 
the marginal expenditure per statistical life lost would be about $60 million.
51 
  Lutter, Morrall, and Viscusi (1999) extended Viscusi’s (1994a) model to account 
for the effect of income to influence risky behaviors (such as smoking, drinking, and poor 
diet) as well as the consumption of health care.  Their statistical analyses illustrate that 
higher incomes promote better health habits, including reduced excessive drinking and 
cigarette smoking and increased exercise.  Including the effects of income on risky health 
behavior reduces the estimated marginal expenditure per statistical life lost from the 
Viscusi (1994a) by more than a factor of 3 to $17 million.  Lutter et al. note that policies 
that increase national income would reduce one fatality for every $17 million increase.  
The authors also note that since many regulations have costs per life saved of $100 
million or more, the expenditures may be wasteful and counterproductive.
52 
  If a regulation directly reduces mortality risk with regulatory-induced 
expenditures yielding a high cost per life saved ratio, then the indirect increase in 
mortality risk may exceed the direct decrease in risk resulting in an aggregate increase in 
                                                 
51 Viscusi (1994a, 1994b) selected a VSL estimate of $5 million (in 1992 US$) because it represented the 
midpoint of the basic range for VSLs of $3 million - $7 million in Viscusi 1993.  In 2000 US$, the 
midpoint would be $6.1 million. 
52 Refer to Morrall (1986) and Tengs et al. (1995) for lists of regulations’ cost-effectiveness for the United 
States.  Tengs et al. found that for 124 environmental regulations (primarily toxin control), the median cost 
per life-year saved is $3.3 million.  About 15 percent of the environmental regulations exceeded $100 
million per life-year saved.  Converting these life-year values to statistical life values would result in a 
significant number of regulations with incredibly exorbitant cost-effectiveness measures.  Life-saving 
regulations in other sectors of the economy (e.g., health care, transportation) had much lower costs per life-
year saved.  Refer to Ramsberg and Sjoberg (1997) for an evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of lifesaving 
interventions in Sweden.     
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societal mortality risk.  The existing literature varies in terms of a preferred value for the 
amount of induced expenditures associated with an additional mortality.  However, some 
regulations would clearly not pass a risk-risk analysis with any plausible value for an 
induced-expenditure mortality.  For example, the 1986 OSHA regulation limiting 
asbestos occupational exposure cost about $250 million per normalized life saved, and 
the 1987 OSHA regulation limiting formaldehyde occupational exposure cost about $290 
billion per normalized life saved (Viscusi, Hakes, and Carlin 1997).   
  While the risk-risk literature has focused on mortality risks, many environment 
and safety regulations provide other kinds of benefits, such as reduced morbidity and 
injury as well as non-human health related effects such as improved visibility and 
ecosystem health (Lutter and Morrall 1994, Portney and Stavins 1994).  A regulation that 
primarily delivers non-mortality benefits could fail a risk-risk analysis but still pass a 
benefit-cost analysis.  One approach could be to convert the morbidity effects into 
mortality risk equivalents.  Alternatively one could focus on policies whose primary 
intent is to reduce mortality risks.  Recognizing this criticism, Hahn, Lutter, and Viscusi 
(2000) conducted risk-risk analysis on a number of major environment, health, and safety 
regulations over the 1986 – 1998 period whose primary benefits were reduced mortality 
risk (see Table 13).
53  Their analysis focuses on 24 regulations promulgated by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), U.S. Department of Labor (OSHA), and U.S. Consumer Products 
Safety Commission (CPSC).  Thirteen of 24 regulations designed primarily to reduce 
mortality risks actually increased mortality risks based on the Lutter et al. work finding 
                                                 
53 Hahn, Lutter, and Viscusi only considered regulations with reduced mortality risk benefits comprising at 
least 90 percent of total monetized benefits.  
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that $15 million of expenditures induces a fatality.  Ten of these thirteen rules failing a 
risk-risk analysis had at least ten times more expenditure-induced fatalities than lives 
saved.
54   
 
10. Conclusion   
  For nearly thirty years, economists have attempted to infer individuals’ 
preferences over mortality and morbidity risk and income in labor and product markets.  
The substantial literature that has developed over that time has confirmed Adam Smith’s 
intuition about compensating differentials for occupational hazards in a significant and 
growing number of countries.  In addition to evaluating various international labor 
markets, the literature has expanded to address a variety of econometric issues, morbidity 
risk premiums, and factors influencing mortality risk premiums such as union affiliation 
and age. 
  While the tradeoff estimates may vary significantly across studies, the value of a 
statistical life for prime-aged workers has a median value of about $7 million in the 
United States.  Our meta-analysis characterizes some of the uncertainty in estimates of 
the value of a statistical life, and finds that 95 percent confidence interval upper bounds 
can exceed the lower bounds by a factor of two or more.  Other developed countries 
appear to have comparable VSLs, although some studies of the United Kingdom have 
found much larger risk premiums.  Consistent with the fact that safety is a normal good, 
developing countries labor markets also have significant, but smaller, values of statistical 
life.  Overall, our point estimates of the income elasticity of the value of a statistical life 
                                                 
54 Note that the construction of discounted statistical lives saved reflects both an accounting for life-years 
saved and discounting for latency.    
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range from 0.5 to 0.6.  Union members in U.S. labor markets appear to enjoy greater risk 
premiums than non-members, while the evidence in other developed countries is rather 
mixed.  The theoretical and empirical literature indicates that the value of a statistical life 
decreases with age. 
  The estimates of the value of a statistical life can continue to serve as a critical 
input in benefit-cost analyses of proposed regulations and policies.  Refining VSLs for 
the specific characteristics of the affected population at risk remains an important priority 
for the research community and the government agencies conducting these economic 
analyses.  Improving the application of VSLs in this way can result in more informed 
government interventions to address market failures related to environmental, health, and 
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Table 1. U.S. Occupational Fatality Rates by Industry, 1992 – 1995 National  Averages 
 
 
  Fatality Rate per 100,000 
Workers 
Industry  NIOSH (NTOF)  BLS (CFOI) 
Agriculture, Forestry, & 
Fisheries 
17.0 23.9 
Mining 24.5  26.3 
Construction 12.8  13.4 
Manufacturing 3.6  3.8 
Transportation & Utilities  10.4  10.6 
Wholesale Trade  3.5  5.4 
Retail Trade  2.8  3.6 
Finance, Insurance, & 
Real Estate 
1.1 1.5 
Services 1.5  1.8 
 
Sources: Rates constructed by authors based on Marsh and Layne (2001) and BLS (n.d.).  
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 Table 2. Summary of Labor Market Studies of the Value of a Statistical Life, United States 











Smith (1974)  Current Population Survey
(CPS) 1967, Census of 
Manufactures 1963, U.S. 
Census 1960, 
Employment and Earnings 
1963 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) 1966, 1967 
0.000125 Yes, 
significant 
No $29,029  $9.2 
Thaler and Rosen (1975)  Survey of Economic 
Opportunity 1967 
Society of Actuaries 1967 0.001  No  No  $34,663  $1.0 
Smith (1976)  CPS 1967, 1973  BLS 1966, 1967, 1970  0.0001  Yes, not 
significant 
No $31,027  $5.9 
Viscusi (1978a, 1979)  Survey of Working 
Conditions, 1969-1970 
(SWC) 
BLS 1969, subjective risk 
of job (SWC) 
0.0001 Yes, 
significant 
No $31,842  $5.3 
Brown (1980)  National Longitudinal 
Survey of Young Men 
1966-71, 1973 
Society of Actuaries 1967 0.002  No  No  $49,019  $1.9 
Viscusi (1981)  Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) 1976 
BLS 1973-1976  0.0001  Yes, 
significant 
No $22,618  $8.3 
Olson (1981)  CPS 1978  BLS 1973  0.0001  Yes, 
significant 
No $36,151  $6.7 
Arnould and Nichols 
(1983) 
U.S. Census 1970  Society of Actuaries 1967 0.001  No  Yes  NA  $0.5, $1.3 






0.00005 No  Yes  $22,713  $1.3  
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1976 (police officer 
wages) 
Constructed a risk 
measure from DOJ/FBI 
police officers killed data 
1972-75 for 72 cities 
0.0003 No  No  $33,172 $1.4 
Dorsey and Walzer (1983) CPS May 1978  BLS 1976   0.000052  Yes, 
significant 
Yes $21,636  $11.8,  $12.3 
Leigh and Folsom (1984)  PSID 1974; Quality of 
Employment Survey 
(QES) 1977 





Smith and Gilbert (1984, 
1985) 
CPS 1978  BLS 1975  NA  No  No  NA  $0.9 
Dillingham and Smith 
(1984) 
CPS May 1979  BLS industry data 1976, 






No $29,707  $4.1-$8.3 
Dillingham (1985)  QES 1977  BLS 1976; NY Workers' 
Compensation data 1970 
0.000008, 
0.00014 
No No  $26,731  $1.2,  $3.2-$6.8 
Leigh (1987)  QES 1977; CPS 1977  BLS  NA  No  No  NA  $13.3 
Moore and Viscusi 
(1988a) 







No Yes  $24,931  $3.2,  $9.4 
Moore and Viscusi 
(1988b) 
QES 1977  BLS, discounted expected 
life years lost; subjective 
risk of job (QES) 
0.00006 No  Yes  $31,092  $9.7  
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Garen (1988)  PSID 1981-1982  BLS 1980, 1981  0.000108  Yes, 
significant 
No $29,865  $17.3 
Viscusi and Moore (1989) PSID 1982  NIOSH NTOF Survey, 
Structural Markov Model 
0.0001 No  No  $24,611  $10.0 
Herzog and Schlottman 
(1990) 
U.S. Census 1970  BLS 1969   0.000097  No  No  $48,364  $11.7 
Moore and Viscusi 
(1990b) 
PSID 1982  NIOSH NTOF Survey, 
Structural Life Cycle 
Model 
0.0001 No  No  $24,611  $20.8 
Moore and Viscusi 
(1990c) 
PSID 1982  NIOSH NTOF Survey, 
Structural Integrated Life 
Cycle Model 
0.0001 Yes Yes  $24,611 $20.8 






Yes $33,627  $0.7 
Gegax, Gerking, and 
Schulze (1991) 
Authors' mail survey 1984 Workers' assessed fatality 
risk at work 1984 
0.0009 No  No  $41,391 $2.1 
Leigh (1991)  QES 1972-3, QES 1977, 
PSID 1974, 1981, 
Longitudinal QES 1973-
1977, CPS January 1977 
BLS 1979, Workers' 
Compensation data from 
11 states 1977-1980 
0.000134 No  No  $32,961  $7.1-$15.3 
Berger and Gabriel (1991) US Census 1980   BLS 1979  0.00008-
0.000097 
No No  $46,865, 
$48,029 
$8.6, $10.9 
Leigh (1995)  PSID 1981, CPS January 
1977, QES 1977 




No No  $29,587  $8.1-$16.8  
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Dorman and Hagstrom 
(1998) 
PSID 1982  BLS 1979-1981, 1983, 




Yes Yes  $32,243  $8.7-$20.3 








NA No  No  $30,245  $1.5,  $3.0  ($2.0, 
$4.0)
† 
† Lott and Manning (2000) estimate represents the value of avoiding a statistical fatal cancer case with an assumed latency period of 10 years (discounted at 3 




Table 3. Summary of Value of a Statistical Life Studies Based on Tradeoffs Outside the Labor Market, United States  




Implicit VSL (millions, 
2000 US$) 
Blomquist (1979)  Automobile death risks, 1972  Estimated disutility of seat belts  $38,395  $1.0 
Dardis (1980)  Fire fatality risks without smoke 
detectors, 1974-1979 
Purchase price and maintenance 
costs of smoke detectors 
NA $0.77 
Portney (1981)  Mortality effects of air pollution, 
1978 
Property values in Allegheny 
County, PA 
NA $1.03 
Ippolito and Ippolito (1984)  Cigarette smoking risks, 1980  Estimates monetary equivalent of 
effect of risk information 
NA $0.90 
Garbacz (1989)  Fire fatality risks without smoke 
detectors, 1968-1985 
Purchase price of smoke detectors  NA  $2.56 
Atkinson and Halvorson (1990)  Automobile accident risks, 1989 Prices of new automobiles  NA  $5.13 
Carlin and Sandy (1991)  Fatality risks with use of 
children's car seats, 1985 
Purchase price of car seats plus 
time to buckle children, 10 Indiana 
cities 
$24,737 $0.84 
Dreyfus and Viscusi (1995)  Automobile safety, 1988  Prices of automobiles  NA  $3.8-$5.4 
Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi (2000)  Superfund sites' cancer risks, 
1988 - 1993 
Property values in Greater Grand 
Rapids, MI 
NA $3.2-$3.7  ($4.3-$5.0)
† 
Jenkins, Owens, and Wiggins (2001)  Bicycle-related fatal head injury 
risks, 1997  
Purchase price of bicycle helmets  NA  $1.4-$2.9 (5-9 year olds) 
$1.2-$2.8 (10-14 year olds)
$2.1-$4.3 (20-59 year olds) 
† Gayer et al. (2000) estimate represents the value of avoiding a statistical cancer case with an assumed latency period of 10 years (discounted at 3 percent).  The 
reported values from their paper without discounting of this latency period are presented in parentheses.  
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Table 4.  Summary of Labor Market Studies of the Value of a Statistical Life, International 
















UK General  Household 
Survey 1975 
OPCS Occupational 
Mortality Decennial Survey 
1970-72 
0.0001 No  No  $14,472  $4.2 
Weiss, Maier, and 
Gerking (1986) 
Austria Austrian  Microcensus 
File of Central Bureau of 
Statistics 1981 
Austrian Social Insurance 
Data on job-related 
accidents 1977 - 1984 
NA  Yes No  $12,011 $3.9,  $6.5 
Meng (1989)  Canada  National Survey of Class 
Structure and Labour 
Process 1981 
Labour Canada and Quebec 
Occupational Health and 
Safety Board 1981 
0.00019 No  No  $43,840  $3.9-$4.7 
Meng and Smith 
(1990) 
Canada National  Election  Study 
1984 
Labour Canada and Quebec 
Occupational Health and 
Safety Board 1981-83 
0.00012 No  No  $29,646  $6.5-$10.3 
Kniesner and Leeth 
(1991) 
Japan Two-digit  manufacturing 
data 1986 (Japan) 
Yearbook of Labor 
Statistics (Japan) 
0.00003 Yes  No  $44,863 $9.7 
Kniesner and Leeth 
(1991) 
Australia Two-digit  manufacturing 
data 1984-85 (Australia, 
by state) 
Industrial Accidents, 
Australia Bureau of 
Statistics 1984 - 1986 
0.0001 Yes  Yes  $23,307  $4.2 
Cousineau, Lacroix, 
and Girard (1992) 




0.00001 Yes  No  $29,665 $4.6 
Martinello and 
Meng (1992) 
Canada  Labour Market Activity 
Survey 1986 
Labour Canada and 
Statistics Canada 1986 
0.00025 Yes  No  $25,387  $2.2-$6.8  
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Ministry of Labor's 
Report on Monthly Labor 
Survey and Survey on 
Basic Statistics for the 
Wage Structures 
Ministry of Labor's 
Analysis for Industrial 
Accidents 
0.000485 Yes  Yes $8,125  $0.8 
Siebert and Wei 
(1994) 
UK General  Household 
Survey 1983 
Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) 1986-88 
0.000038 Yes  No $12,810  $9.4-$11.5 
Lanoie, Pedro, and 
Latour (1995) 





0.000126 Yes  No $40,739  $19.6-$21.7 
Sandy and Elliott 
(1996) 
UK Social  Change  and 
Economic Life Initiative 
Survey (SCELI) 1986 
OPCS Occupational 
Mortality Tables Decennial 
Supplement 1979/80-
1982/3 
0.000045 No  No $16,143  $5.2-$69.4 
Shanmugam 
(1996/7) 
India  Author's survey of blue 
collar manufacturing 
workers, Madras, India 
1990 
Administrative Report of 
Factories Act 1987-1990 
0.000104 No  No  $778 $1.2,  $1.5 
Liu, Hammitt, and 
Liu (1997) 
Taiwan Taiwan  Labor  Force 
Survey 1982-1986 




No  No  $5,007 - $6,088 $0.2-$0.9 
Miller, Mulvey, and 
Norris (1997) 
Australia Australian  Census  of 




Health and Safety 
Commission 1992-93 
0.000068 No  No $27,177  $11.3-$19.1 
Siebert and Wei 
(1998) 
Hong Kong Hong Kong Census 1991 Labour Department  0.000139  No  No  $11,668  $1.7 
Liu and Hammitt 
(1999) 
Taiwan  Authors' survey of 
petrochemical workers 
1995 
Workers' assessed fatality 
risk at work 1995 
0.000513 Yes  No $18,483  $0.7  
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Meng and Smith 
(1999) 




0.00018 Yes  Yes  $19,962  $5.1-$5.3 
Arabsheibani and 
Marin (2000) 
UK General  Household 
Survey (1980s) 
OPCS Occupational 
Mortality Decennial Survey 
1979-83 
0.00005 Yes  No  $20,163 $19.9 
Shanmugam (2000) India  Author's survey of blue 
collar manufacturing 
workers, Madras, India 
1990 
Administrative Report of 
Factories Act 1987-1990 
0.000104 Yes  No  $778 $1.0,  $1.4 
Shanmugam (2001) India  Author's survey of blue 
collar manufacturing 
workers, Madras, India 
1990 
Administrative Report of 
Factories Act 1987-1990 
0.000104 Yes  No  $778  $4.1 
Sandy, Elliott, 
Siebert, and Wei 
(2001)  
UK  SCELI 1986  OPCS 79/80 - 82/3, HSE 
1986 - 88 




Table 5a. Summary of Labor Market Studies of the Value of Statistical Injury, United States  
Author 










Implicit Value of a Statistical Injury 
(2000 US$) 
Smith (1974) Current Population Survey 
(CPS) 1967, Census of 
Manufactures 1963, U.S. 
Census 1960, Employment 
and Earnings 1963 





No $29,029  -$30,934 




No $31,027  nonfatal  injury  coefficient not significant 
Viscusi 
(1978a, 1979) 
Survey of Working 
Conditions, 1969-1970 
(SWC) 





No $31,842  $25,693-$49,442 
Viscusi 
(1978b) 
SWC 1969-1970  BLS non-fatal injury 
rate 1969 (pre-
OSHA) 






Wisconsin Census 1970  Wisconsin Workers' 
Compensation 
accident data 1970 
0.05  No No $34,414  $141,659 
Viscusi 
(1981) 
Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) 1976 




No $22,618  $59,238 
























CPS May 1973 - 1975  BLS mean lost 
workdays per worker 
1972 - 1974 
0.701  No  No  NA  Not reported -- can't calculate (positive 
and statistically significant) 
Leigh (1981) PSID 1974, QES 1977  BLS injury rates 
1974 
NA Yes,  not 
significant 
No  NA  Not reported -- can't calculate (positive 
and statistically significant) 













CPS May 1978  BLS nonfatal lost 
workday injury 
incidence rate 1976 
0.03 Yes,  some 
specifications 
Yes $21,636 $60,581,  $69,235 
Smith (1983) CPS 1978  BLS Work Injury 
Rate 





Compensation survey 1977, 
BLS May 1978, BLS May 
1979 
BLS 0.036  Yes,  not 
significant 






PSID 1974; Quality of 
Employment Survey (QES) 
1977 








Author's chemical worker 
survey, 1982 
Workers' assessed 
injury and illness 
rate 


















CPS May 1977  BLS industry data 
1977 
NA  Yes  No  NA  Not reported -- can't calculate  
Viscusi and 
Moore (1987) 
QES 1977  BLS lost workday 




No Yes  $43,503  $70,650  lost workday accident; $27,950 
for nonpecuniary loss-lost workday 
accident; $45,400 per accident 
Biddle and 
Zarkin (1988) 
QES 1977  BLS nonfatal lost 
workday injury 
incident rate, 1977 
0.037  No No $42,170 $168,603  (willingness to accept), 
$155,582 (willingness to pay) 
Garen (1988) PSID 1981-1982  BLS nonfatal injury 
rate, 1980-1981 




QES 1977  BLS annual 









Authors' survey in Eugene, 
OR, 1987 
Workers' assessed 
injury rate using 
BLS lost workday 
incidence rate scale 
0.059  No  No (one state)  $21,897  $72,429 (whole sample); $39,468 
(smokers); $118,277 (seat belt users) 
Viscusi and 
Evans (1990) 
Viscusi and O'Connor 
chemical worker survey 
Utility function 
estimates using 
assessed injury and 
illness rate 









No  Yes  NA  Not reported -- can't calculate (positive 


















CPS 1978  BLS lost workday 
injury rate  









0.048  No No $46,284  $48,928 
Fairris (1992) SWC 1969-1970  BLS 1969 industry 
injury frequency rate





Expenditure Survey 1987 
BLS total lost 
workdays per worker 
per year 1987 
0.702
†  No No $26,345  $120,709  (whole  sample);  $155,453 
(nonsmoker-seat belt users); $83,186 




QES 1977  constructed a risk 
measure  
NA  Yes  No  $24,267  $155,435-$242,671 WTP to avoid one 




PSID 1982  BLS 1981  0.052  Yes  Yes   $32,243  Nonfatal injury coefficient not significant 
Hersch 
(1998) 
CPS March 1994  BLS 1993 (number 
of cases of days 






No No $28,004  $22,810-$33,723  (females);  $12,146-




















Expenditure Survey 1987 
BLS 1987 injury rate 












† Note that the measure used in the Hersch and Pickton study – probability of losing 1 workday due to injury per worker per year – differs from the measure used 
in most other studies – probability of a lost workday injury per worker per year.    
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Table 5b. Summary of Labor Market Studies of the Value of Statistical Injury, International 




















NA Yes  No  $29,665  $38,104 
Martinello and 
Meng (1992) 
Canada  Labour Market Activity 
Survey 1986 
Labour Canada and 
Statistics Canada 1986 
0.063  Yes  No  $25,387  $10,815-$14,456 for injury; 
$161,210-$191,027 for 
severe injury 
Siebert and Wei 
(1994) 
UK General  Household 
Survey 1983 
Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) 1986-88 
data 
0.0143  Yes  No  $12,810  coefficient on injury risk not 










0.099 Yes No $40,739  $8,148 
Liu and 
Hammitt (1999) 
Taiwan  Authors’ survey of 
petrochemical workers 
1999 
Workers’ assessed injury 
risk at work 1995 
0.0109 Yes  No  $18,483  $49,717 
Meng and 
Smith (1999) 








Yes  Yes  $19,962  $423 per work day lost 
Shanmugam 
(2000) 
India  Author's survey of blue 
collar manufacturing 
workers, Madras, India 
1990 
Administrative Report of 
Factories Act 1987-1990 
0.0729 Yes  No  $778  $150-$560 
Shanmugam 
(2001) 
India  Author's survey of blue 
collar manufacturing 
workers, Madras, India 
1990 
Administrative Report of 
Factories Act 1987-1990 
0.0729 Yes  No  $778  $350  
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Table 6. Replication of Published Meta-Analyses with Viscusi-Aldy Data 
Variable 
Viscusi-Aldy 
Version of Liu 




Version of Miller 















log(VSL) log(VSL)  VSL  (Expressed  in 





(0.17)  - - 
        
Income  - -  0.078** 
(0.031)  - 
       
Hourly Wage  - -  - 0.040 
(0.026) 
        
Mean Risk  -0.015* 




        
Mean Risk 
Squared   - -  - 0.0019 
(0.0015) 
        
Union  x  
Mean Risk  - -  - 0.22*** 
(0.11) 
        
Dillingham 
Risk  - -  -  -0.32 
(0.58) 
        
Society of 
Actuaries Risk  -  -1.29* 
(0.28)  - - 
        
BLS Risk  - -  1445.18** 
(591.47)  - 
       
NIOSH Risk  - -  - 0.27 
(0.40) 
        
Education 
Level  - -  -157.14 
(192.32)  - 
       
Unemployment 
Rate  - -  - 0.045 
(0.048) 
        
U.S. National 
Data  - -  - 0.31 
(0.82) 
        
Non-U.S. 
Study  - -  -  -0.0048 
(0.81) 
        




        
Union Dummy 








Version of Liu 




Version of Miller 















log(VSL) log(VSL)  VSL  (Expressed  in 
Per Hour Terms) 
log(VSL) 
       
Male Only 
Sample  - -  -588.20 
(600.82)  - 
       
Blue Collar 




        
Quadratic Risk  - -  - 0.54 
(0.33) 




- -  - 
0.11 
(0.32) 
        
log(Dependent 
Variable)  - -  -  -0.24 
(0.36) 









        
Urban Dummy 




        
Workers’ 
Compensation  - -  - 0.10 
(0.45) 
        
Wage in After 
Tax Terms  - -  -  -0.29 
(0.50) 




- -  - 
0.081 
(0.27) 




- -  - 
0.0039 
(0.20) 






(0.33) -  - 





- -  - 
-0.021 
(0.51) 













Version of Liu 




Version of Miller 















log(VSL) log(VSL)  VSL  (Expressed  in 
Per Hour Terms) 
log(VSL) 
        
R
2 0.37  0.27  -  0.83 
        
n 46  49  45  41 
Specifications (1), (2), and (4) estimated with ordinary least squares. 
Specification (3) estimated with robust regression with Huber weights. 
Robust (White) standard errors are presented in parentheses for specifications (1), (2), and (4). 
Asymptotic standard errors presented in parentheses for specification (3). 
* Indicates statistical significance at 1 percent level. 
** Indicates statistical significance at 5 percent level. 
*** Indicates statistical significance at 10 percent level.  
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Table 7. Income Elasticity of Willingness-to-Pay to Reduce Mortality Risk  
Paper (Model)  Reported Elasticity in 
Authors’ Papers  Viscusi-Aldy Version 
Liu et al. (1997)  
(Equation 2) 
0.53 0.51* 
(0.21 – 0.80) 
    
Miller (2000)  
(Model 3) 
0.89* 0.53* 
(0.20 – 0.86) 
    
Mrozek and Taylor (2002) 
(Model 2) 
0.46** 0.52 
(-0.18 – 1.22) 
    
Bowland and Beghin (2001) 
(Linear Model) 
1.66* 0.61** 
(0.11 – 1.10) 
* Indicates elasticity is based on coefficient that is statistically significant at 1 percent 
level. 
** Indicates elasticity is based on coefficient that is statistically significant at 5 percent 
level. 
Ranges in parentheses represent the 95 percent confidence interval around the point 
estimate for the income elasticity.  
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Table 8.  Regression Models for Viscusi-Aldy Meta-Analysis  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regression 
Technique 






































Society of Actuaries 
Risk 
- -  0.50 
(0.87) 
- -  dropped 
            
NIOSH Risk  -  -  0.50 
(0.41) 
- -  0.56 
(0.41) 
Subjective -  -  -0.69 
(0.78) 




- -  0.44 
(0.32) 
- -  0.50 
(0.30) 
            
Male Only Sample  -  -  0.24 
(0.36) 
- -  0.36 
(0.34) 
            
Blue Collar Sample  -  -  -0.016 
(0.31) 
- -  -0.23 
(0.33) 
            
Quadratic Risk  -  -  0.092 
(0.27) 
- -  0.20 
(0.34) 
            
Morbidity Variable 
Included 
- -  0.55*** 
(0.30) 
- -  0.62** 
(0.30) 
            
log(Dependent 
Variable) 
- -  0.17 
(0.31) 




- -  -0.16 
(0.25) 




- -  0.38 
(0.29) 




- -  -0.57 
(0.33) 




- -  -0.46 
(0.27) 




- -  -0.45 
(0.31) 















2 0.37  0.55  0.72  -  -  - 
            





(0.21 – 0.80) 
0.49 
(0.23 – 0.75) 
0.60 
(0.27 – 0.94) 
0.48 
(0.23 – 0.73) 
0.46 
(0.24 – 0.69) 
0.47 
(0.15 – 0.78) 
Mean Predicted VSL, 
Full Sample (millions 
2000 US$)  (95% 
Confidence Interval) 
5.0 
(3.4 – 7.4) 
5.4 
(3.7 – 7.8) 
5.9 
(2.7 – 13.9) 
5.5 
(4.1 – 7.5) 
5.9 
(4.4 – 8.1) 
6.2 
(2.5 – 15.7) 
Mean Predicted VSL, 
U.S. Sample (millions 
2000 US$)  (95% 
5.5 
(3.8 – 8.1) 
5.8 
(4.1 – 8.3) 
6.9 
(3.1 – 16.2) 
6.1 
(4.6 – 8.2) 
6.3 
(4.8 – 8.4) 
7.6 
(3.0 – 19.4)  
 
109
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regression 
Technique 







Dependent variable: log(VSL) 
Robust (White) standard errors presented in parentheses for specifications 1 – 3. 
Asymptotic standard errors presented in parentheses for specifications 4 – 6. 
* Indicates statistical significance at 1 percent level. 
** Indicates statistical significance at 5 percent level. 
*** Indicates statistical significance at 10 percent level. 
Note: Estimation with robust standard errors clustered by wage data source yields same significance levels, with the 
exception of Mean Risk in (1) and (3) and Mean Risk Squared in (3), which are all significant at the 2 percent level, and the 





Table 9a.  Summary of Union Effects in Value of a Statistical Life Studies, United States 






















Survey of Economic 
Opportunity 1967 
Society of Actuaries 
1967 
0.001 No  No  $34,663  $1.7-$1.9  Negative  Risk x union interaction  
Viscusi (1980)  SWC 1969-1970  BLS 3-digit industry 
data for 1969 
0.000118 Yes  No  $31,842  $5.5-$15.2  Not  significant Risk x union interaction  
Olson (1981)  CPS 1978  BLS 1973  0.0001  Yes, 
significant 
No $36,151  $30.6-$44.2  $5.7-$5.8  Risk x union interaction 
and separate regressions 
by union status 
Dorsey (1983)  Employers' Expenditures 
for Employee 
Compensation survey 
1977, BLS May 1978, 
BLS May 1979 
BLS 0.000071  Yes, 
significant 
Yes, in some 
specifications 
$33,019  $9.6  Negative  Risk x union interaction  
Dorsey and 
Walzer (1983) 
CPS May 1978  BLS 1976   0.000052  Yes, 
significant 




CPS May 1979  BLS industry data 1976, 
1979; NY Workers' 





No $29,707  $6.1,  $6.6 $3.1  Separate regressions by 
union status 
Garen (1988)  PSID 1981-1982  BLS 1980, 1981  0.000108  Yes, 
significant 











Authors' mail survey 
1984 
Workers' assessed 
fatality risk at work 
1984 
0.0009  No  No  $41,391  $2.7  Not significant Separate regressions by 
union status  
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Commission data 1893 - 
1909, 1926 - 32, 1934 – 
45 













PSID 1982  BLS 1979-1981, 1983, 








Table 9b. Summary of Union Effects in Value of Statistical Injury Studies, United States 








Level (2000 US$) 
Union Implicit 




Value of a 
Statistical Injury 
(2000 US$) 
Specification of Union 
Status 
Biddle and Zarkin 
(1988) 
QES 1977  BLS nonfatal lost 
workday injury 
incident rate, 1977 
0.037 No  No  $42,170  $319,678  $56,832  Risk x union interaction 
Freeman and 
Medoff (1981) 
CPS May 1973 – 
1975 
BLS mean lost 
workdays per 
worker 1972 - 1974




  Separate regressions by 
union status 
Smith (1983)  CPS 1978  BLS Work Injury 
Rate 






Risk x union interaction 
Fairris (1992)  SWC 1969-1970  BLS 1969 industry 
injury frequency 
rate 













smaller than union 
value of injury 
Risk x union interaction 





BLS total lost 
workdays per 
worker per year 
1987 
0.702* No  No  $26,345  $222,448  $99,478 Risk x union interaction 
*Lost workdays per 100 full-time workers.  
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Table 9c.  Summary of Union Effects in Value of a Statistical Life Studies, International 

































  Risk x union 
interaction  
Meng (1989)  Canada  National Survey of 














  Risk x union 
interaction  
Meng and Smith 
(1990) 













  Risk x union 
interaction  





















0.00001 Yes  No  $29,665 $4.4  $2.0  Separate regressions 
by union status 
Martinello and 
Meng (1992) 











  Risk x union 
interaction   
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Siebert and Wei 
(1994) 





0.0000379 Yes No  $12,810  $11.5  $9.4  Separate regressions 















Sandy and Elliott 
(1996) 























0.000104 No  No  $778  $0.6  Not 
significant 






Ministry of Labor's 
Report on Monthly 
Labor Survey and 
Survey on Basic 











  Risk x union 
interaction   
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reported as    
-0.006 





  Risk x union 
interaction  
Sandy, Elliott, 
Siebert, and Wei 
(2001)  
UK  SCELI 1986  OPCS 79/80 - 









 Table 10.  Summary of Age-Risk Interaction Effects in Value of a Statistical Life Studies, United States 
Author (Year)  Sample  Average Age 
of Sample  Risk Variable  Age x Risk Variable Coefficient
Thaler and Rosen 
(1975) 
Survey of Economic 
Opportunity 1967 
41.8  Society of Actuaries 1967 Significant  (5%),  negative 
Viscusi (1979)  Survey of Working Conditions, 
1969-1970 (SWC) 
39.7  BLS 1969, subjective risk of 
job (SWC) 
Significant (1%), negative 
Portney (1981)  Property values in Allegheny 
County, PA 1978 
NA  Air pollution annual mortality 
rate data, EPA 
VSL by age females (males): less 
than 45: $1.5 (1.0) million; 45-
64: $0.3 (0.12) million; over 65: 
$0.05 (0.05) million 
Arnould and Nichols 
(1983) 
U.S. Census 1970  NA  Society of Actuaries 1967  Significant (1%), negative 
Moore and Viscusi 
(1988b) 
QES 1977  38.1  Expected life years lost (=BLS 
fatality risk x discounted 
remaining life) 
Significant (1%), positive 
(implies risk premium increases 
with life expectancy, decreases 
with age, ceteris paribus) 
Meng (1989)  National Survey of Class 
Structure and Labour Process 
1981 
39.9  Labour Canada and Quebec 
Occupational Health and 
Safety Board 1981 
Significant (10%), negative 
Meng and Smith 
(1990) 
National Election Study 1984  NA  Labour Canada and Quebec 
Occupational Health and 
Safety Board 1981-83 
Insignificant 
Dillingham, Miller, 
and Levy (1996) 
QES 1977  36.5  Constructed a risk measure   Declining scale of WTP to avoid 




Author (Year)  Sample  Average Age 
of Sample  Risk Variable  Age x Risk Variable Coefficient
Shanmugam (1996/7) Author's survey of blue collar 
manufacturing workers, 
Madras, India 1990 
34.1  Administrative Report of 
Factories Act 1987-1990 
Insignificant 
Shanmugam (2001)  Author's survey of blue collar 
manufacturing workers, 
Madras, India 1990 
34.1  Administrative Report of 




Table 11.  Summary of Imputed Discount Rate Studies, United States 
Year  Author (Year)  Type of Study  Sample  Implicit 
Discount Rate
1988 Moore  and 
Viscusi 
(1988b) 
Labor Hedonic with 
Reduced Form 
Discounting Model 
QES 1977  9.6%-12.2% 
1989 Viscusi  and 
Moore (1989) 
Labor Hedonic with 
Structural Markov 
Model 
PSID 1982  10.7% 
1990 Moore  and 
Viscusi 
(1990b) 
Labor Hedonic with 
Structural Life Cycle 
Model 
PSID 1982  2% 
1990 Moore  and 
Viscusi 
(1990c) 
Labor Hedonic with 
Structural Integrated 
Life Cycle Model 
PSID 1982  1.0%-14.2% 
1995 Dreyfus  and 
Viscusi (1995) 










Table 12. Values of Statistical Life Used by U.S. Regulatory Agencies, 1985 – 2000* 
Year Agency  Regulation 
Value of a 
Statistical Life 
(millions, 2000 $) 
1985 Federal  Aviation 
Administration 





Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives; Gasoline Lead 
Content (50 FR 9400) 
$1.7 
1988 Federal  Aviation 
Administration 
Improved Survival Equipment for Inadvertent Water 




Protection of Stratospheric Ozone (53 FR 30566)  $4.8 
1990 Federal  Aviation 
Administration 
Proposed Establishment of the Harlingen Airport Radar 
Service Area, TX (55 FR 32064) 
$2.0** 
1994 Food  and  Nutrition 
Service (USDA) 
National School Lunch Program and School Breakfast 
Program (59 FR 30218) 
$1.7, $3.5** 
1995 Consumer  Product 
Safety Commission 
Multiple Tube Mine and Shell Fireworks Devices (60 
FR 34922) 
$5.6** 
1996 Food  Safety 
Inspection Service 
(USDA) 
Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Point Systems (61 FR 38806) 
$1.9 
1996 Food  and  Drug 
Administration 
Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of 
Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children 
and Adolescents (61 FR 44396) 
$2.7** 
1996 Federal  Aviation 
Administration 
Aircraft Flight Simulator Use in Pilot Training, 





Requirements for Lead-Based Paint Activities in 
Target Housing and Child-Occupied Facilities (61 FR 
45778) 
$6.3 
1996 Food  and  Drug 
Administration 
Medical Devices; Current Good Manufacturing 










Radon in Drinking Water Health Risk Reduction and 




Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: 
Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emissions Standards and 
Gasoline Sulfur Control Requirements (65 FR 6698) 
$3.9, $6.3 
2000 Consumer  Product 
Safety Commission 
Portable Bed Rails; Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (65 FR 58968) 
$5.0** 
* This table augments a similar presentation of values of a statistical life used in U.S. regulatory analyses in 
Adler and Posner (2000) by including more regulations and presenting VSLs in constant year dollars. 
** The published summaries of the regulatory impact analyses for these rules do not specify the year in 
which the reported dollars are denominated.  We have assumed that the dollar year corresponds to the date 
of rule publication for purposes of converting all values into 2000 dollars.  Note that the CPSC reported a 





Table 13.  Evaluation of Risk-Risk Tradeoff for 24 U.S. Regulations, 1986 – 1998 










Toxicity characteristics to determine 
hazardous wastes 
1990 EPA  0.048  -23  23 
Underground storage tanks: technical 
requirements 
1988 EPA  1.1  -22  24 
Manufactured home construction and 
safety standards on wind standards 
1994 HUD  1.5  -3.2  4.7 
Process safety management of highly 
hazardous chemicals 
1992 DOL  220  -42  260 
Regulations restricting the sale and 
distribution of cigarettes and 
smokeless tobacco to protect children 
and adolescents 
1996 HHS  4,700  -140  4,900 
Medicare and Medicaid programs: 
hospital conditions of participation; 
identification of potential organ, 
tissue, and eye donors; and transplant 
hospitals' provision of transplant-
related data 
1998 HHS  710  9.2  700 
Quality mammography standards  1997  HHS  75  1.4  74 
Food labeling regulations  1993  HHS  520  10  510 
Childproof lighters  1993  CPSC  95  2.9  92 
Standard for occupational exposure to 
benzene 
1987 DOL  4.4  1.8  2.6 
Occupational exposure to methylene 
chloride 
1997 DOL  12  5.9  6.2 
Occupational exposure to 4,4' 
methylenedianiline 
1992 DOL  0.7  0.71  -0.01 
Asbestos: manufacture, importation, 
processing, and distribution in 
commerce -- prohibitions (total) 
1989 EPA  3.9  4.3  -0.41 
National primary and secondary 
water regulations -- phase II: 
maximum contaminant levels for 38 
contaminants 
1991 EPA  44  63  -19 
Occupational exposure to asbestos  1994  DOL  13  20  -7.1  
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Hazardous waste management system 
-- wood preservatives 
1990 EPA  0.29  0.83  -0.55 
Sewage sludge use and disposal 
regulations, 40 CFR pt. 503 
1993 EPA  0.24  2.6  -2.3 
Land disposal restrictions for "third 
third" scheduled wastes 
1990 EPA  2.8  30  -27 
Hazardous waste management 
system: final solvents and dioxins 
land disposal restrictions rule 
1986 EPA  1  12  -11 
Occupational exposure to 
formaldehyde 
1987 DOL  0.21  4.8  -4.5 
Prohibit the land disposal of the first 
third of scheduled wastes ("second 
sixth" proposal) 
1988 EPA  2.9  66  -63 
Land disposal restrictions -- phase II: 
universal treatment standards and 
treatment standards for organic 
toxicity, characteristic wastes, and 
newly listed wastes 
1994 EPA  0.16  8.3  -8.2 
Drinking water regulations, synthetic 
organic chemicals -- phase V 
1992 EPA  0.0061  3.4  -3.4 
Solid waste disposal facility criteria, 
40 CFR pt. 257 and pt. 258 
1991 EPA  0.0049  10  -10 





Table A. Description of Variables Used in Viscusi-Aldy Meta-Analyses 
Variable Description  Summary Statistic, 
Viscusi-Aldy data 
VSL  Value of a statistical life (millions, 2000 US$)  $6.7 ($5.6) 
Income  Annual labor income (2000 US$)  $26,006 ($12,002) 
Mean Risk  Average mortality risk of sample  0.0002 (0.0003) 
Hourly Wage  Hourly wage or hourly equivalent of weekly income (2000 
US$) 
$13.00 ($6.00) 
Union VSL  VSL for union members only (dummy variable)  4/49 
Dillingham Risk  VSL based on Dillingham (1985) constructed New York 
workers compensation-based fatality risk measure (d.v.) 
1/49 
Society of Actuaries 
Risk  
VSL based on Society of Actuaries 1967 mortality risk data 
(d.v.) 
2/49 
BLS Risk  VSL based on BLS mortality risk measure (d.v.)  16/49 
NIOSH Risk  VSL based on NIOSH mortality risk measure (d.v.)  5/49 
Subjective  VSL based on self-reported measure of mortality risk (d.v.)  1/49 
Education Level  Barro-Lee average educational attainment for population > 
25 by country (in years) 
9.6 (2.0) 
Unemployment Rate  Annual unemployment rate by year of wage data  7.6 (4.6) 
U.S. National Data  VSL based on national U.S. worker sample (d.v.)  24/49 
Non-U.S. Study  VSL based on non-US wage-risk study (d.v.)  22/49 
Male Only Sample  VSL based on male only sample (d.v.) 21/49 
Blue Collar Sample  VSL based on blue collar only sample (d.v.)  15/49 
Quadratic Risk  VSL based on econometric specification quadratic in 









VSL derived from specification with natural logarithm of 
dependent variable (d.v.) 
44/49 
Union D.V.  VSL based on specification that included dummy variable 
for union affiliation (d.v.) 
32/49 
Regional D.V.  VSL based on specification with regional dummy variables 
(d.v.) 
24/49 





VSL based on specification with workers’ compensation 
variable (d.v.) 
11/49 
Wage in After Tax 
Terms 
VSL based on specification with income expressed in after-
tax terms (d.v.) 
10/49 
Industry D.V.  VSL based on specification with industry dummy variables 
(d.v.) 
21/49 
Occupation D.V.  VSL based on specification with occupational dummy 
variables (d.v.) 
20/49 
No Occupation D.V.  Study does not include occupational dummy variables  29/49  
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VSL based on specification with variables describing job 
characteristics (d.v.) 
10/49 
Means (standard deviations) reported for continuous variables.  
Share of studies in which variable equals 1 reported for dummy variables. 
n =49 